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DISABLING THE ADA: ESSENCES, BETTER ANGELS, AND
UNPRINCIPLED NEUTRALITY CLAIMS
AVIAM SOIFER*
"Thou shalt not curse the deaf, nor put a stumbling-block before the
blind ......
The current Supreme Court delights in proclaiming devotion to
matters the Justices define as "essential." As with other kinds of
fundamentalism, the crucial question tends to be where one starts.
Presumptions also matter. Even judicial protection for the dignity
of somebody or something may turn out to be key.2
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I am grateful to the William and Mary
School of Law and to my fellow participants for what turned out to be an unusually fruitful
and enjoyable symposium. In particular, I thank Michael Stein for his exceptional hard work,
imagination, enthusiasm, and assistance. This Article also benefitted greatly from the efforts
of several research assistants, particularly Raushanah Daniels, Julio Portilla, and Dan Roth,
as well as from Alice Lyons' customary invaluable help. Friends and colleagues Tom Baker,
Freda Fisher, Linda Long, Allan Macurdy, Michael Stein, and Carol Weisbrod read drafts
and helped save me from myself, at least somewhat. They contributed generously from their
remarkable inventories of abilities, wisdom, and very limited time. Finally, the Law Review
staff proved to be an unusually pleasant group of people with whom to work and their help
with this Article is much appreciated.
1. Leviticus 19:14. "IBlut thou shalt fear thy God: I am the Lord[,J" the Hebrew Bible
continues. Id. One might think that it is not good to curse someone who can hear, or to put
a stumbling block in front of anyone else. The "special treatment" suggested is underscored,
and perhaps made still more paradoxical, by what follows. We next are told, "Ye shall do no
unrighteousness in judgment; thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor favour the
person of the mighty-, but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour." THE PENTATEUCH
AND HArORAHS 500-01 (J.H. Hertz ed., 2d ed. 1961). I began to explore this paradox, which
is also a source for the language of the current federal judicial oath, in AVIAM SoIFER, LAW
AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 164-81 (1995).
2. The abstract concept of dignitary harms to the states has become a crucial benchmark,
as the Court recently emphasized in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State
Ports Authority, 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1874 (2002) (holdingthat state sovereign immunity precludes
adjudication of a private party's claim against a nonconsenting state by federal agency,
because "[tlhe preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity
that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities"). That the dignity of people with
disabilities counts for much less will become apparent in this Article.
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There is a tendency, of course, for the essences discovered by
judges to overlap with what is decried as result-oriented judging.
Yet the facade ofjudicial neutrality today seems unusually prone to
enable activist judges to launch preemptive strikes against
protective measures they dislike. Current judges claim to do this in
the name of essential autonomy, but generally it is in the service of
those in power. Indeed, we increasingly seem to function under the
kind of Platonic Guardianship vehemently criticized in an earlier
era.
3
Notwithstanding the current majority's frequent declarations
of a clear, binary world full of essences, it is sobering to consider
the incoherence in the Justices' statements about the adequate
grounding, metes and bounds, and regular topography of public law.
Concern for turf is a crucial judicial trope today. So is the Court's
insistence on a series of Manichean choices that the Court alone
may make. As this Article suggests, the way that sovereignty over
the legal landscape is mapped-and even the question of whether
the territory may be regulated at all by any government-is now a
dominant constitutional motif reaching far beyond the realm of
property disputes. It is now clear that a majority of the Justices
often deny that there is or should be any middle ground-or, for that
matter, any significant public law changes that are not instigated
by the Justices themselves.
The current Supreme Court, for example, intercedes actively on
behalf of essences it perceives in the realms of federalism,4 property
3. Forexample, JusticeBlack, dissentingin Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479(1965),
cited Learned Hand's well-known statement, "For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled
by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do
not.'" Id. at 526-27 (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTs 73 (1958)).
4. Within the Court's recent-and already noticeably lengthy-string of New Federalism
decisions, for example, a narrow majority repeatedly has interposed its vision of some essence
of dual sovereignty to invalidate contrary judgments by Congress and earlier Court majorities.
See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1871, 1879 n.18 (2002)
(holding that principles of state sovereign immunity are not anchored in constitutional text
but are "embedded in our constitutional structure" and "enshrined in our constitutional
framework"); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (limiting the reach of the
Commerce Clause); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 581 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The true 'essence' of federalism is that the States as States have
legitimate interests which the National Government is bound to respect even though its laws
are supreme.") (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
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rights,5 and even Roe v. Wade.6 Sadly, this judicial phenomenon is
hardly limited to constitutional law. Judicial authoritarianism also
abounds in the name of statutory interpretation.
The Court's recent deconstruction of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) provides a series of striking illustrations. In
the name of essences that the Justices alone can discern, the Court
repeatedly ignores or overrules Congress. It also rejects inter-
pretations painstakingly worked out by lower court judges.7 The
Court has turned an important civil rights statute into an unseemly
hash. Little noted and not remembered is the spirit at the time of
5. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (requiring essential nexus
between legitimate state interests and permit condition); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992) (identifying the notion of "essential use" of land); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704 (1987) (regarding as a taking the abrogation of the right of individual Indian tribal
members to pass on property via descent and device, similar to essential right of owner to
exclude from property). At a minimum, the essentialist drive in the realm of regulatory
takings was slowed down by Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002). In fact, there is no plausible textualist argument to
support the Court's recent aggressive expansion of the regulatory takings doctrine led by
Justice Scalia. A deep problem in text, history, and logic remains because after the Fifth
Amendment offers the protection against deprivation of"life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law," it continues, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment repeats the due process
formulation, of course, but it then omits the next clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Thus
somersaults are necessary-and not even attempted by the Court--to claim that the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to incorporate a specific guarantee of just
compensation when that very protection was stated in the Fifth Amendment text they copied,
but strikingly omitted from the new Fourteenth Amendment.
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In a well-known statement regarding stare decisis by Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the three found it "imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe's
original decision .... Id. at 869. Their joint opinion insisted that "to overrule Roe's essential
holding" would entail no less than "the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the
Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law." Id. at 836. There has
been considerable debate as to whether the troika did indeed preserve some essence, or
instead left standing only what Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent called "a sort of judicial
Potemkin Village ..... Id. at 966.
7. It is striking that this Court, whose docket has shrunk significantly in recent years,
continues to take and decide many ADA cases. During the 2001 Term, in which the Court
handed down only eighty-three full decisions, four decisions directly involved the ADA. In all
four, the Court reversed the decisions of the courts of appeals. As will be discussed below, in
Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002), the Court was unanimous. In Barnes v. Gorman, 122 S. Ct.
2097 (2002), there was a somewhat bitter division as to the appropriate basis for the decision,
but all the Justices again agreed on the result. In US Airways v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516
(2002), however, the Court could hardly have been more splintered.
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the ADA's passage, when President George H.W. Bush hailed the
new law as "an historic opportunity. It signals the end to the
unjustified segregation and exclusion of persons with disabilities
from the mainstream of American life."' As we shall soon see, the
ADA, as construed by the current Court, can hardly be said to do
much of anything to protect people with disabilities. Instead the
Court's activist interventionism has done a great deal to shield both
private employers and public officials, in addition to denying the
importance of past discrimination while preserving as much of the
pre-ADA status quo as possible. The Court's central message to
people with disabilities seems to be, "Get over it."
Plato may have advocated a search for abstract pure essences, but
his student, Aristotle, suggested that such a quest must be premised
on engagement with concrete cases.9 The current Court's restrictive
view of the ADA seems to be virtually the stultifying obverse of the
Court's broad, case-by-case interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. But that earlier, permissive approach to civil rights
guarantees- much more in keeping with the ADA's words, findings,
and clear intentions-remains viable; occasionally, it can even be
discerned peeping out from under the current Court's work product.
In the current Supreme Court, however, there are simply not
enough votes to sustain a significant countertrend.
Nonetheless, a different, better legal approach should not be
allowed to disappear under the mound of the Court's recent
technical-seeming, yet actually sweeping, interpretations of the
ADA. Such a different approach entails critical attention to starting
places. This approach is more concerned with human dignity than
with the dignity of the states, though it recognizes that both often
can be protected simultaneously. It also heeds some of the
traditional demands of judicial craftsmanship. In construing a
statute such as the ADA, for example, such an interpretation seeks
to understand what problems Congress targeted and what Congress
actually said and did.
8. Statement of President George Bush, 26 WEEKLY COW. PRES. DoC. 1166 (July 26,
1990). That the first Bush administration was not entirely consistent about the ADA,
however, is made clear in Allan Macurdy, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: A Time
for Celebration or A Time for Caution?, 1 B.U. PUB. INTIf L.J. 21 (1991).
9. See ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS Book VII (Montgomery Furth trans., 1985).
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During the Court's 2000 Term, two major ADA decisions starkly
illuminated basic assumptions by the Justices concerning statutory
language, default positions, and the appropriate weight to be
accorded change. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett' and PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin" also highlighted a possible
alternative approach, in which seemingly inconsistent views of the
legal claims of people with disabilities might be reconciled. By
pursuing the intersection of essences and accommodation, of legit-
imate starting points and acceptable changes in Part I, we learn a
good deal about what treating like cases alike currently means, as
well as what the concept ought to entail if we take the ADA
seriously. A statutory regimen that purports to protect the full and
equal rights of those of us who are not entirely able to compete
equally with fellow citizens in all aspects of life underscores deep
dilemmas of capability and paternalism. Concrete consideration of
the ADA's alternative possibilities, however, also emphasizes both
the Court's sloppiness and its own transgressions of the limits of the
law.
This Article begins with a brief review of the Court's extra-
ordinarily cramped view of Congress' constitutional power in
Garrett. That decision, holding that Congress could not consti-
tutionally include employment discrimination practiced by states
within the range of the individual damage remedies mandated by
the ADA,'2 is already having substantial repercussions. Moreover,
the purported constitutional underpinning for Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion turns out to be both very recent and
very shaky.
At first glance, a concurring opinion in Garrett, written by Justice
Kennedy and joined by Justice O'Connor, might seem to offer some
hope. Upon closer examination, however, this decisive concurrence
reveals a stark lack of both self-awareness and empathy, conjoined
with a failure of the judicial imagination, in the name of preserving
the purported neutrality of states that discriminate in employment.
Part II considers Martin, and the Court's surprising seven-to-two
vote upholding application of the ADA's public accommodation
10. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
11. 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
12. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366-67.
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provision, thus allowing a competitive player on the professional
golf tour to use a golf cart during tournament play.13 A brief
comparison of this victory for the ADA with other recent decisions
about public accommodations helps explain why the Martin
dissenters-Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas-were so upset.
Casey Martin won an important victory, but it is most likely to be
largely symbolic. In fact, when we compare Martin to the Garrett
decision, we may begin to suspect a stealth strategy on the part of
the swing voters on the Court. The swing Justices will accept
narrow instances of ADA coverage that are likely to grab public
attention and are easily restricted to their unusual facts. Yet a
majority remains firmly unconvinced that millions of people with
disabilities need substantial legal protection in the major activities
of life-or the Justices may believe that those who are disabled may
not constitutionally be permitted to receive such protection from the
federal government.
Part III discusses some significant implications of the general
view of disability that emerges from the Court's most recent
decisions. If disability cases serve as a kind of Rorschach test,
then it is striking just how revealing this test can be. Even brief
comparison with several recent appellate court decisions under-
scores the incoherence of the Court's either/or, and only purportedly
individualized, approach to disability issues.
Part IV dares to reenter the nearly impenetrable definitional
tangle that has resulted from the Court's aggressive reluctance
to accept the ADA on its own terms.1' It focuses on the Court's
four decisions construing the ADA during the 2001 Term. The
inconsistency and even incoherence in the Court's approach is most
clearly discerned by looking closely at Toyota Motor Manufacturing
v. Williams."5 But this Part also briefly considers the paternalism
13. Martin, 532 U.S. at 661.
14. It is noteworthy that the Court continues to choose to take so many ADA cases,
particularly at a time when it is taking many fewer cases than did its predecessor Courts not
many years ago. See supra note 7. See generally Margaret M. Cordray & Richard Cordray, The
Supreme Court's Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 737 (2001) (providing both empirical
and nonempirical analysis of the declining size of the Court's plenary docket). For a discussion
of the Court's earlier ADA decisions, see Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default,
and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279 (2000).
15. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
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found acceptable by a unanimous Court in Echazabal; the very
narrow survival of an employment discrimination claim when
Barnett confronts an employer-imposed seniority system;16 and the
Gorman7 Court's willingness to protect defendants from punitive
damage awards anchored in successful ADA claims.
Finally, this Article briefly sketches the implications of an
alternative approach. To illustrate, it juxtaposes the basic concept
of public accommodations with the case-by-case "reasonable
accommodation" requirement of the ADA. By statute, public
accommodations must afford full, as well as equal, "enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations
of any place of public accommodation ...."' This section suggests the
importance of protection as well as equality; of alterations,
renovations, and progress as well as historic preservation; and of
recognizing the fundamental values of a living tradition rather than
struggling to remain confined to some imagined, frozen past. By
reconsidering what the Justices recently have said about our heads
and hearts-and even about how we constitute "us" and "them" in
the disability context-we may discover a better, more direct, and
more ecologically sound path across the entangled, rocky
underbrush of current disability law.
I. POSiTIVE LAW, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND OUR BETTER ANGELS:
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA V. GARRETT 19
A Hardheaded--and Even Hardhearted-States
1. Equal Protection v. Positive Law
At first reading, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in
Garrett may seem simply a predictable extension of what the Court's
16. US Airways v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
17. Barnes v. Gorman, 122 S. Ct. 2097 (2002).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000). As the Court elaborated in Martin, "The phrase 'public
accommodation' is defined in terms of 12 extensive categories, which the legislative history
indicates 'should be construed liberally' to afford people with disabilities 'equal access' to the
wide variety of establishments available to the nondisabled." 532 U.S. at 676-77 (footnotes
omitted).
19. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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vigorous activism in the name of federalism recently has wrought.
The Court held that the enforcement power granted to Congress
through Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
extend to using the ADA to protect people with disabilities from
employment discrimination perpetrated by states.2' But Chief
Justice Rehnquist actually managed to go even further in rejecting
the results of democratic processes than the Court previously had
done in its recent explosion of New Federalism decisions. 2' Indeed,
Garrett illustrates that the current Court has devised an entirely
new series of steps to divide and conquer congressional power.22
Three of the Court's moves were breathtaking.
First, the Court switched the burden to prove constitutionality
to anyone who seeks to vindicate congressional power-and made
it a heavy burden at that. Rehnquist stated that the first step
is to seek precise identification of the constitutional right at
stake.2 Apparently only one source occurred to the Court in de-
fining that constitutional right, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.24 Because the Cleburne Court purported to apply
only permissive lower tier "rational relationship" scrutiny to a
discrimination claim based on the disabilities of residents of a group
home, it follows, said Rehnquist, that Congress may go no further.'
But actually Rehnquist read Cleburne exclusively in terms of its
dictum. Even in doing this, Rehnquist compounded a bitter irony.
He failed to notice that a specific reason Cleburne Court gave for not
applying heightened scrutiny on behalf of the mentally retarded
20. Id. at 374.
21. For a somewhat lengthier discussion of Garrett within the New Federalism context,
see Aviam Soifer, Courting Anarchy, 82 B.U. L. REV. 699 (2002).
* 22. This is reminiscent of what the Court did to eviscerate Reconstruction. See generally
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BmIRH OF FREEDOM 41-85 (1997) (discussing the
Slaughterhouse Cases and other cases that severely limited the meaning and. application of
the Civil War Amendments); Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE
L.J. 1916 (1987).
23. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
24. 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (applying "rational relation" test to determine the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance prohibiting "hospitals] for the feeble minded"). But see
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (upholding a Kentucky law establishing disparate burdens
of proof for committing "mentally retarded" and "mentally ill" individuals); Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding a Virginia statute entailing mandatory sterilization for
mentally disabled women).
25. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.
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plaintiffs in the case was that a positive legislative response, "which
could hardly have occurred and survived without public support,
negates any claim that the mentally retarded are politically
powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the
attention of the lawmakers."26 Garrett, paradoxically, invalidated
the very type of legislative victory the Cleburne majority relied upon
in deciding that persons with disabilities do not require heightened
judicial solicitude. To compound the irony even more, however,
Rehnquist blatantly ignored what the Court actually did in
Cleburne. That the disabled plaintiffs won the case in Cleburne was
nowhere mentioned in Garrett. Such selective misreading of a case's
holding ought to embarrass a first-year law student.
In Cleburne, the Court in fact carefully examined and rejected a
series of purported reasons offered by government officials in
defense of their official actions against mentally retarded people.
Justice White's lead opinion specifically noted that the link between
a claimed governmental rationale and any purported end sought by
the government could not be so attenuated as to be arbitrary; he
also insisted that the bare desire to harm a politically unpopular
group is constitutionally illegitimate.27 Yet, White added, consti-
tutional protection must stretch further. He explained, "Beyond
that, the mentally retarded, like others have and retain their
substantive constitutional rights in addition to the right to be
treated equally by the law."" Looked at with care, the Court
found that the actions of the government officials seemed anchored
in "irrational prejudices" and thus were invalid. It should be noted
-particularly in light of Rehnquist's treatment of Cleburne as if it
were an extremely deferential, low-tier equal protection case akin
to a challenge to an economic regulation-that a majority of the
Justices endorsed more aggressive equal protection scrutiny than
White's opinion applied in Cleburne.29 Yet even White's opinion was
26. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445.
27. Id. at 447.
28. Id. By suggesting that mentally retarded people retain substantive rights, such as
freedom of association, as well as equality rights, the Court echoed distinct prongs of the
famous footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1937).
29. Rehnquist, who joined White's Cleburne opinion, might have remembered that Justice
Stevens, along with Chief Justice Burger, also joined White's opinion but added a separate
concurrence advocating a continuum for equal protection analysis, rather than the three tiers
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anything but deferential as it scrutinized with care and then struck
down governmental discrimination against people with disabilities.
Rehnquist's next step was to hold that workplace practices that
unquestionably constitute employment discrimination against
persons with disabilities, when practiced by states, are likely to be
economically rational-and thus entirely beyond the reach of
constitutional law. 0 To get to this shocking point, Rehnquist first
observed, "States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment
to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their
actions toward such individuals are rational."3 ' He then asserted,
"They could quite hardheadedly-and perhaps hardheartedly-hold
to job-qualification requirements which do not make allowance for
the disabled." 2
In case we missed it, toward the end of his majority opinion,
Rehnquist offered a reprise of his embrace of admittedly dis-
criminatory conduct. He explained the unconstitutional burden that
an overreaching Congress imposed through the ADA as follows:
"[Wihereas it would be entirely rational (and therefore consti-
tutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources
by hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities, the ADA
requires employers to 'mak[e] existing facilities used by employees
readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.""
Stripped to its basics, the Court perceived a stark conflict. The
rationality of economic maximizing along with states' rights must
prevail over Congress' efforts to prevent discrimination.
generally favored by the Court. Stevens likened the situation of people with disabilities to
classifications of people based on gender, alienage, and illegitimacy. This connection was,
Stevens explained, "because the characteristics of these groups are sometimes irrelevant to
a valid public purpose, or, more specifically, to the purpose that the challenged laws
purportedly intended to serve." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 453. He called for "especially vigilant"
judicial scrutiny of government classifications that deal with groups whose members face a
"tradition of disfavor." Id. at 453 n.6. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and
Blackmun, concurred in part in the judgment and dissented in part. The Marshall trio
forcefully advocated a higher level of judicial scrutiny in cases that involve disability
classifications.
30. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369-72.
31. Id. at 367.
32. Id. at 367-68.
33. Id. at 372 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bX5XB), § 12111(9) (2000)).
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Garrett establishes a triumphant syllogism:
(1) It is rational for states to save money by refusing to
make any allowances for the disabled.
(2) The Court's equal protection analysis will accept any
rational basis for state classifications-including
classifications that admittedly discriminate--even if
they inarguably and directly hurt disabled people.
Therefore,
(3) Congress may not use its enforcement powers to
reach employment discrimination practiced by states.
Under Garrett, Congress is constitutionally disabled from
enacting legislation that affirmatively seeks to guarantee con-
stitutional rights through the enforcement clauses of the
Reconstruction Amendments. The post-Civil War amendments are
said to be limited starkly to matters of negative liberty. 4 The Court
thus has arrogated for itself untethered authority to engage in
second-guessing Congress.
It is particularly galling that the majority seized this sweeping
discretionary authority in the name of determining "the metes
and bounds of the constitutional right in question," after which
"we examine whether Congress identified a history and pattern of
unconstitutional employment discrimination by the States against
the disabled." 5 But the final infuriating move was the way the
Court determined that Congress did not sufficiently identify such a
history and pattern.
The Garrett majority resorted to a Fractured Fairy Tale approach,
reminiscent of Goldilocks' methodology, when it turned to the
extensive findings and record assembled by Congress in support of
the ADA. If Congress noted too many examples, as in the Violence
Against Women Act" struck down in United States v. Morrison,7
the legislation would be unconstitutional because it was too
sweeping; if Congress found too few incidents, however, the record
34. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
35. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
37. 529 U.S. 598,626-27 (2000) (concluding that Congress lacked constitutional authority
under the Commerce Clause to enact the remedy in § 13981).
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turned out to be anecdotal, and therefore constitutionally in-
adequate.' What might be just right remains a secret, apparently
entirely a matter of what porridge the Justices want for breakfast.
Sometimes the Court almost playfully knocks clusters of
congressional findings entirely out of consideration just before
assessing whether the congressional findings will suffice. In Garrett,
for example, in the course of addressing the extensive record of
numerous discriminatory acts perpetrated by state and local
governments as duly noted by Congress, the Court used a grand non
sequitur to wipe all local government examples from consideration.
Discriminatory acts by local entities-normally actionable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983-simply disappeared on the grounds that the
Eleventh Amendment has been held to shield states, but not their
subdivisions. The Court thus transformed all of Congress' fact-
finding about discriminatory practices by cities, towns, counties, and
other localities into nothingness.39 Of course, those who worked hard
to pass the ADA in 1990 had no way of knowing that the Court's
subsequent expansion of states' rights barriers-as a direct limit on
Congress' enforcement power-would have fatal repercussions for
congressional fact-finding completed years earlier.
Most of all, the Garrett majority condemned constitutional duties
imposed on the states. The Fourteenth Amendment is often read as
an attempt to require states to do things. As Rehnquist stated for
the Court, however, "[i]f special accommodations for the disabled are
to be required, they have to come from positive law and not through
the Equal Protection Clause."' Prior to Garrett, would anyone have
thought that the Equal Protection Clause is somehow distinct from
and apparently less than positive law?
Startling as this notion may be, it is consistent within the Chief
Justice's dichotomous world view. States' rights severely limit
or even eliminate federal authority to enact "positive law." Under
38. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-31 (1997) (holding religious Freedom
Restoration Act unconstitutional because, in contrast to Voting Rights Act of 1965, legislative
record lacked modern examples adequate to support congruence and proportionality of
congressional action).
39. As we will see when we consider Barnes v. Gorman, 122 S. Ct. 2097 (2002), the Court
also has found sweepingly restrictive means of statutory interpretation to limit the
effectiveness of litigation by individuals deprived of their civil rights. See infra note 197 and
accompanying text.
40. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.
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Garrett, every state's understandable and even commendable
desire to "conserve scarce financial resources"' becomes a trump.
Moreover, Congress confronts an iron triangle if it seeks to establish
the kind of factual predicate the Court now requires for any
forward-looking efforts to combat discrimination.42 Neither statistics
nor anecdotes will do. Further, it certainly is not constitutionally
permissible for the dignity of the states to suffer harm.
2. "Our Own Human Instincts,' "The Better Angels of Our
Nature," and 'Those Disadvantaged by Mental or Physical
Impairments'
If the Garrett majority opinion ended on a discordant positive law
note, Justice Kennedy's concurrence, joined by Justice O'Connor,
began on a genuinely positive note. Suggesting that progress is
possible, Justice Kennedy offered an important insight: "Prejudice,
we are beginning to understand, rises not from malice or hostile
animus alone.' In fact, Kennedy added, "[Prejudice] may result as
well from insensitivity caused by simple want of careful, rational
reflection or from some instinctive mechanism to guard against
people who appear to be different in some respects from ourselves."'47
Yet after this significant opening, Kennedy quickly moved to
identify a great struggle between "our own human instincts"' (that
unsettle us when we encounter people who seem different), on the
one hand, and "the better angels of our nature,"'9 on the other.
While our baser human instincts and better angels must wrestle
each other, Kennedy seemed to make his own preference clear. He
stated his admiration for the ADA, for example, describing it as "a
milestone on the path to a more decent, tolerant, progressive
41. Id. at 372.
42. For a discussion of the unreal Goldilocks quality of what the Court's new
constitutional demands in support of congressional action are, see Soifer, supra note 21, at
712-13.
43. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
44. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 376 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 374 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
47. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
49. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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society." '° Perhaps echoing Brandeis' famous Olmstead v. United
States51 dissent, Kennedy also emphasized that "law can be a
teacher"52 and that the lessons law can teach may be significant.
Indeed, he added sweepingly that "[olne of the undoubted achieve-
ments of statutes designed to assist those with impairments is that
citizens have an incentive, flowing from a legal duty, to develop a
better understanding, a more decent perspective, for accepting
persons with impairments or disabilities into the larger society." 3
But there is a fatal flaw, perhaps some version of original sin. We
cannot live in a happy world of citizens learning from the law while
progress is made. The Constitution demands invalidation. Why?
The explanation was anchored in Kennedy's insistence on reifying
sovereignty. He was explicit on this point, describing the states
as "neutral entities, ready to take instruction and to enact laws
when their citizens so demand."54 Elsewhere, Kennedy famously
celebrated the genius of the Framers in their ability to "split the
atom of sovereignty,"55 but in Garrett he could see only neutral
states that are limited to taking instruction from their own
demanding state citizens. There may not be a federal legislative
teacher. No middle ground can be found.
The only exception is if a stringent precondition is met. There
must be "confirming judicial documentation," Kennedy maintained,
because "purposeful and intentional action [is] required to make
out a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."' Only judges are
50. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
51. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
52. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375. Dissenting in Olmstead, Justice Brandeis emphasized the
crucial role the government plays as a teacher, and he tied this point to his view that
lawlessness by government officials ought not to go unsanctioned. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
53. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375. There seems to be something to Justice Scalia's charge that
Justice Kennedy can be "sententious." See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661,704 (2001)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (decrying Justice Kennedy's stated satisfaction in his Garrett
concurrence that the ADA will help promote a "decent, tolerant, progressive society").
54. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
55. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
56. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring). But see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98, 105 (2001) (per curiam) (assessing whether the state satisfied its "obligation to avoid
arbitrary and disparate treatment"); Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000)
(observing that allegations of "irrational and wholly arbitrary" treatment, "quite apart from
the Village's subjective motivation, are sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional
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constitutionally reliable. Congress may not impose money dam-
ages against the states to enforce "a new awareness, a new
consciousness, a new commitment to better treatment of those
disadvantaged by mental or physical impairments ..
Upon reflection, the last quoted statement is even more striking
than it first appears. Recall that Justice Kennedy began his
concurring opinion with "our own human instincts" and "the better
angels of our nature.""8 Yet by the end of his brief concurrence,
Kennedy and O'Connor had begun to refer to people with disabilities
not as "us" (nor even as "those among us") but rather as "those
disadvantaged."59 The struggle between human instincts and better
angels was resolved, the better angels had been crushed.
The states may be "neutral entities," but the Court must protect
their dignity. It must intervene against the clear wishes of Congress
in order to assure that these sovereigns are not insulted. The
states--even when they function in the role of employers-may not
be held liable to a national antidiscrimination commitment. Rather,
as neutral vessels, they respond accountably to the wishes of their
citizens. Somehow, those state citizens presumptively approve
hiring and firing decisions by the state bureaucracy-even if those
decisions involve discrimination based on disability.
"It is a most serious charge," Kennedy explained, "to say a State
has engaged in a pattern or practice designed to deny its citizens the
equal protection of the laws, particularly where the accusation is
based not on hostility but instead on the failure to act or the
omission to remedy."' Because such a failure or omission "does not
always constitute" proof of an adequately egregious discriminatory
pattern or practice, Kennedy assumed that they never will-unless
there is the "predicate" of "the documentation of patterns of
constitutional violations committed by the State in its official
equal protection analysis"); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)
(finding no rational basis for, and thereby invalidating, application of city ordinance to home
for those with mental disabilities).
57. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
59. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
60. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). In sharp contrast, the majority in Bush v. Gore appeared
to accept the petitioners' core claim described by Justice Stevens as "an unstated lack of
confidence in the impartiality and capacity of the state judges who would make the critical
decisions if the vote count were to proceed." Bush, 531 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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capacity."61 If such adequate "judicial documentation" ever is found,
of course, then the very courts that provided that documentation are
ready and able to remedy "patterns of constitutional violations." No
congressional action would be required.
The "neutral entities" of the states, therefore, have little to worry
about from any federal concern to protect "those disadvantaged by
mental or physical impairment."6 2 Ironically, Justice O'Connor-
herself a victim of breast cancer-joined Kennedy in ignoring the
fact that Patricia Garrett was a victim of both breast cancer and
state employment discrimination.' Along with other people
Congress sought to protect under the ADA, Patricia Garrett surely
ought to have counted as one of "us," rather than facing callous
dismissal by the Court as well as by her employer. There was
absolutely no connection between Patricia Garrett's breast cancer
and her capacity to perform her job as Director of Nursing." As
someone within the anonymous mass of "those disadvantaged,"
however, she now could have no claim against her state employer.
Initial recognition of the ADA as a significant "milestone on the
path to a more decent, tolerant, progressive society"" is rapidly
transmuted into another kind of stone. Sisyphus comes to mind.
Abstractions have become "dispositive" and states' rights concepts
must shield "neutral entities." "Those disadvantaged" cannot hope
to budge such an elusive and massive stone wall.
61. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
62. Id.
63. Other Justices, as well as Justice O'Connor, have suffered from diseases and physical
ailments that might be classified as "disabilities." What they apparently have not
encountered, however, is clear discrimination because of such disabilities. Thus an
understandable fear of crowded dockets, perhaps compounded by the kind of anxiety about
diminished abilities that is common among many of us as we reach the "certain ages" of the
Justices, seems to have triumphed over deference to what Congress said and did. It certainly
swamped the Justices' ability to get outside themselves, and to empathize with people who
seem different. See generally Soifer, supra note 14, at 1287-90..
64. Garrett underwent a lumpectomy, radiation treatment, and chemotherapy, and was
informed when she returned to work that she would have to give up her position as Director
of Nursing, OB/Gyn/Neonatal Services at the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital.
The plaintiff in a companion case that reached the Court, Milton Ash, received poor
performance evaluations after the Alabama Department of Youth Services denied him a
transfer recommended by his doctor because of his chronic asthma and sleep apnea. See
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 362.
65. Id.
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II. "A BENEVOLENT COMPASSION THAT THE LAW DOES NOT PLACE
IT WITHIN OUR POWER TO IMPOSE "66
By contrast, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin17 suggests a kind of nested
Russian doll. The case may be hard to take entirely seriously. For
one thing, it seems so easily confined to its facts: the very unusual
circumstance of an extraordinarily talented, dedicated plaintiff who
has a clear, rare disability, yet who still does exceptionally well
competing in a commercial sports event that actually is open to
anyone willing to pay a hefty entrance fee to enter the competition.
68
But on closer scrutiny, the Martin case actually brimmed over with
an intricate play within a play. Ultimately, a specific and very
commercial series of acts turned out to be "the thing."69
There is much to be learned as we follow the course in Martin.
First, there are important aspects of the crucial metaphor of what
constitutes a level playing field, developed in the apt setting of golf.
These became crucial matters not only within a game in which
carrying a handicap is a familiar construct, but also in the larger
realm of what accommodations we might be obliged to make for
persons with disabilities. Martin also illuminates the increasingly
contested issue of how public accommodations should be defined
and governed. Finally, the Martin decision suggests that there
ought to be substantial middle ground between familiar, somewhat
threadbare dichotomies such as public/private and action/inaction.
The Court's holding in Martin, that a limited specific accom-
modation did not fundamentally alter the ancient game of golf,
heightened the visibility of its decision-as well as the sarcasm and
ire of the dissenters.
66. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 691 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
68. In addition to the hefty entrance fee, two letters of recommendation were required;
the majority asserted that this did not create a meaningful barrier. Martin, 532 U.S. at 679-
80. Scalia's dissent did not dispute this point.
69. WILLIAM SHAKEsPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2 (A.R. Braunmuller ed., 2001).
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A. An Intensively Fact-Based Inquiry"°
To the majority, the Martin case presented two essential
questions: (1) whether the ADA protected access to professional golf
tournaments for tournament participants and (2) whether a
disabled competitor could be denied the use of a golf cart on the
grounds that to allow him to use a cart would "fundamentally alter
the nature" of the tournament?7
Strikingly, the Court's answers to these questions-yes, the ADA
reached Casey Martin's situation; and no, it did not alter golf
fundamentally to allow him to ride in a golf cart, even while
competing in golfs top tournaments-generated great public
response.72 Many of those who passionately attacked the decision
entirely missed the nuanced, fact-specific nature of Justice Stevens'
majority opinion. Actually the seven-to-two majority closely followed
the fact-finding and analysis of the lower courts.73
Thus, for example, while conceding that fatigue and stamina were
key elements in famous tournament outcomes,74 Stevens observed
that the ADA's "basic requirement" is "that the need of a disabled
person be evaluated on an individual basis .... ,,7 That inquiry
revealed that even when Martin rides on a cart, he "must walk over
a mile during an eighteen-hole round," and "the fatigue he suffers
from coping with his disability is 'undeniably greater' than the
70. Martin, 532 U.S. at 673 (quoting Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th
Cir. 2000)).
71. Id.
72. In the days immediately following the decision, radio talk shows were full of
discussions about the case and newspaper stories, columns, and editorials also discussed it
vigorously. Opinions seemed-at least to one casual observer-to be closely divided between
who were for and against (as well as pro and amateur). It may be, as Hunter Thompson once
observed (quoting Raoul Duke), "When the going gets weird, the weird turn pro." HUNTERS.
THOMPSON, THE GREAT SHARK HUNT: STRANGE TALES FROM A STRANGE TIME v (1979).
73. Martin, 532 U.S. at 671-79 (reviewing the lower court's analysis of whether the PGA
Tour was a public accommodation, and whether the purpose of the rule at issue could
reasonably be modified without frustrating the intent of the rule).
74. Id. at 674 (citing the experiences of Ken Venturi and Ben Hogan); see also Olinger v.
United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated by 532 U.S. 1064 (2001).
75. Martin, 532 U.S. at 690 (relying upon Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
483 (1999), and the Court's rejection of any equivalence between "outcome affecting" and
"fundamentally altering").
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fatigue his able-bodied competitors endure from walking the
course."
76
The Court also rejected an asserted conflict between Titles I and
III of the ADA, and with it the PGA's claim that Martin could only
bring a "job-related" discrimination claim under Title 1. 7 In fact,
said the Court, even if Title III were held to be restricted to "clients
[and] customers," as the PGA argued, "it would be entirely
appropriate to classify the golfers who pay petitioner $3,000 for the
chance to compete in the Q[ualifying]-School and, if successful, in
the subsequent tour events, as petitioner's clients or customers."78
Stevens maintained that the tournament actually had two sets of
clients or customers: those who paid to watch and those who paid to
play. In fact, the high entry fee structure readily distinguishes the
PGA Tour from the parade of horribles described in Scalia's
dissent.7 s It also suggests, however, how easy it would be for the
PGA simply to alter its entry fee arrangement, through which "any
golfer with the requisite letters of recommendation acquires the
opportunity to qualify for and compete in petitioner's tours." '
In an important sense, Martin's emphasis on fact-specificity
means it is not much of a precedent for other situations. That said,
Martin has great symbolic importance. The majority's willingness
to find some middle ground (even on a golf course) on which
there must be reasonable accommodation suggests a view of dis-
crimination that is the antithesis in several important respects
of Garrett's willful embrace of hardheaded and hard-hearted
discriminatory conduct.
76. Martin, 532 U.S. at 671-72.
77. Id. at 678-82.
78. Id. at 679-80. Scalia's dissent did not respond to this point about economics. In fact,
soon after the ADA passed, one of the authors of the Act mentioned that golf courses were
covered by the statute, and regulations implementing the ADA supported this view. See
Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413,423 (1991).
79. Scalia warned that down the slippery slope established by the Martin decision there
would be claims to have four strikes allowed in Little League games and other such radical
changes in the rules of various sports. Martin, 532 U.S. at 702-03.
80. Id. at 680. "Any member of the public may enter the Q-School by submitting two
letters of recommendation and paying a $3,000 entry fee to cover greens fees and the cost of
golf carts, which are permitted during the first two stages, but have been prohibited during
the third stage since 1997." Id. at 661.
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To the Martin Court, the ADA is directly analogous to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, both in its specific coverage and on a deeper
level. Under either statute, one who owns or operates a place of
public accommodation has a duty not to discriminate, notwith-
standing whatever business sense or fiscal interest might surround
such discrimination. Like race, disability may not be the basis for
invidious discrimination. Moreover, Title III specifically defines
"discrimination" as 'a failure to make reasonable modifications
in policies, practices, or procedures ... necessary to afford' a broad
range of goods, services, and so forth to individuals with dis-
abilities.81
As discussed below, the idea of discrimination as a failure to act
is vitally important-though it is also generally anathema to the
current Justices. That Martin was a seven-to-two decision, with only
Scalia and Thomas dissenting, emphasizes how sympathetic Casey
Martin was as a plaintiff. It also suggests how skillfully Stevens
wove together his interpretation of the cloak of ADA coverage-but
also how limited the reach of the Martin decision is likely to be.
In fact, Stevens summarized the decision in a way that
emphasized its limits: "A modification that provides an exception to
a peripheral tournament rule without impairing its purpose cannot
be said to 'fundamentally alter' the tournament.8 2 Yet to Scalia and
Thomas, dissenting, the Martin opinion was anything but a mere
modification on the periphery. Instead, Scalia scolded, Stevens
provided an answer to an "incredibly difficult and incredibly silly
question" concerning what is "essential" to golf. The Court's
response was "quite absurd," according to Scalia, who added that
the majority's intrusion violated "the very nature of competitive
sport," which is "the measurement, by uniform rules, of unevenly
81. Id. at 682 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2XA)(ii) (2000)):
A failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures,
when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities,
unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations.
Id. Stevens explained that requirements of accommodation are merely extensions to provide
citizens with disabilities a chance to compete and enjoy the job functions of the workplace
with other non-disabled employees.
82. Martin, 532 U.S. at 690.
83. Id. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1304 [Vol. 44:1285
DISABLING THE ADA
distributed excellence."" Scalia's outraged dissent-extreme even
for a Justice known for his rhetorical firebombs-is illuminating
about judicial concern for essences and the nature of things and
people.
B. "Misty-Eyed Judicial Supervision of a Revolution'
Scalia made it clear that he disagreed with the Court's use of its
authority to interpret the ADA. He decried the majority's invocation
of power to exercise "a benevolent compassion"86 and to undertake
"misty-eyed ... supervision"" of what he characterized as an
illegitimate revolution. And that was just for openers. In his single,
penultimate sentence, for example, Scalia termed the majority
decision "Kafkaesque;" condemned "its Alice in Wonderland
determination that there are such things as judicially determinable
'essential' and 'nonessential' rules of a made-up game;" and derided
its "Animal Farm" notion of fairness." Beyond stacking literary
sources, Scalia made it plain throughout his dissent that the
majority had struck a nerve. For instance-perhaps put sharply,
even for Scalia-he suggested at one point that in construing the
ADA as they did, his fellow Justices lacked either humility or self-
respect.8 9 To Scalia, "the rules are the rules'9°-and the PGA must
remain the ultimate rulemaker. Neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court ought to have any say in the matter. The rules of golf are
outside or beyond legal regulation.91
84. Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 704 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 704 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia concluded his remarkable sentence, "The year
was 2001, and 'everybody was finally equal.' Id. (citing Kurt Vonnegut, Harrison Bergeron,
in ANIMAL FARM AND RzLATED READINGS 129 (1997)).
89. Martin, 532 U.S. at 700-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "Either out of humility or out of
self-respect (one or the other) the Court should decline to answer this incredibly difficult and
incredibly silly question." Id. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This particular Scalia binary
choice refers to whether walking is a fundamental aspect of golf. To Scalia, the Court engaged
in defining "classic, Platonic golf," id. at 700, in making the judgment required by the ADA
as to whether a "reasonable modification ... would fundamentally alter the nature of such
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations." 42 U.S.C. §
12182(bX2)(A)(ii) (2000).
90. Martin, 532 U.S. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
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It is hardly self-evident that Scalia's own pronouncements display
the virtues of deference. One even might say that the very essence
of Scalia's condemnation is that the PGA is private, and, therefore,
unreached and perhaps unreachable by the ADA-or by Congress
generally.92 This, too, is a species of Platonic essentialism. Combined
with the Court's refusal to defer to Congress in Garrett and its other
recent decisions intervening in the name of federalism, Scalia's
position would establish a broad expanse of both public and private
discriminatory conduct exempt from federal law.93 Scalia is among
the primary shapers of an extreme, essentialist view of federalism-
concededly not a direct nor strict construction of any constitutional
text.94
A key distinction, illuminated by Scalia's dissent in Martin, rests
on two connected claims. First, he maintained that the PGA Tour
simply cannot be a public accommodation offering "good, service,
facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation" covered by Title III
of the ADA.9" Rather the PGA Tour is akin to the California Bar
Examination, an open audition for a movie or play, or an open
tryout for a baseball team." A professional golfer cannot be a buyer
of anything offered by a public accommodation; he must be
exclusively a seller, and thus someone who simply cannot"enjoy" his
work at all. Scalia would strictly separate the ADA's Title I,
covering employment discrimination, from Title III, which covers
the enjoyment of public accommodations. For Scalia, in fact, much
turns on a circular definition he provided: "The only distinctive
feature of places of public accommodation," he proclaimed, "is that
they accommodate the public .... '97 Being public in this sense is no
92. In United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), for example, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion relied upon but also echoed the tragic whipsaw of the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court claimed that because the Fourteenth Amendment
deals only with the actions of state officials, Congress may not utilize its enforcement power,
based on Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, to reach the actions of private
individuals who committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-
21.
93. See Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111
YALE L.J. 619 (2001).
94. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999) (Scalia, J.); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991) (Scalia, J.).
95. Id. at 696 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2XAXii) (2000)).
96. Id. at 696-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 694 (Scalia, J., dissenting). His full statement was: "The only distinctive feature
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different from being private. The public/private distinction collapses
entirely. Because of Scalia's pinched sense of what a public
accommodation is, however-it has no essence, and may be an
empty, tautological set-it seems to follow that Congress may not be
permitted to treat public accommodations differently from other
businesses.98
Second, according to Scalia, the majority read the ADA to
mandate a "ridiculous thing," which he described as "one set of rules
that is 'fair with respect to the able-bodied' but 'individualized' rules
... for 'talented but disabled athletes.'"" The general and the
particular must be strictly kept apart. Otherwise, the managing
bodies of sports in effect are being told by the Court to "try to take
account of the uneven distribution of God-given gifts when writing
and enforcing the rules of competition.""° One rule must fit all. This
is true of professional sports, no matter how open the qualifying
stages, and it should be true of the world generally. Tinkering by
law-legislative, administrative, or judicial-interferes with the
God-given natural state.
Scalia sardonically condemned the majority for its concern for
"classic, Platonic golf."' °' Yet the essentialist worldview of private
ordering that Scalia advances could hardly be more clearly the
workproduct of a Platonic Guardian at full throttle. As we will
see, the definition of "public accommodations," as well as the need
for contextual attention to what would constitute a reasonable
accommodation, should not and cannot disappear. Scalia may be
pushing hemlock as the Socratic solution to regulations dealing with
disability, but the real world continues to intrude.
of places of public accommodation is that they accommodate the public, and Congress could
have no conceivable reason for according the employees and independent contractors of such
businesses protections that employees and independent contractors of other businesses do not
enjoy." Id. (emphasis in original).
98. Given that for Scalia the category of "public accommodation" is so narrow as possibly
to be a vacuum-perhaps a legal concept with no essence at all-there may be a lurking
invitation for advocates to challenge public accommodation laws and regulations on broad
constitutional grounds. If a regulatory category lacks any basis for the differential treatment
the government applies, any such treatment could be thought to violate either recent equal
protection or takings law precedents. See, e.g., Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562
(2000), and cases discussed supra note 5.
99. Martin, 532 U.S. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 703-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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III. DISCRIMINATION AND POSITIVE LAW: "THE ADA DOES NOT
ONLY MANDATE THAT INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES BE
TREATED THE SAME AS PERSONS WITHOUT SUCH DISABILITIES" 0 2
Scalia argued in his Martin dissent that even if the PGA Tour
were considered a public accommodation for Title III purposes, the
ADA offers no basis to inquire whether alterations are required
once access is granted. To illustrate a distinction between possibly
permissible regulation of access, but clearly impermissible regu-
lation of content, Scalia quoted at length from a Seventh Circuit
opinion written by Chief Judge Posner."°3
In Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., Posner held that an
insurance company's selective cap on policy benefits for AIDS or
AIDS-related conditions did not violate Title III of the ADA. Mutual
of Omaha stipulated that it "has not shown and cannot show' that
its low lifetime benefits limits "'are or ever have been consistent
with sound actuarial principles, actual or reasonably anticipated
experience, bona fide risk classification, or state law.'"105 Yet the
insurance company prevailed. Even if the mere mention of
insurance law seems intimidating, it is worth examining some
deeper elements of Posner's decision. His reasoning has significance
well beyond the realm of insurance."
Characteristically, Posner utilized telling analogies as he rejected
the claim of discrimination in the caps allegedly prohibited by the
ADA. Unsupported (and, by stipulation, unsupportable) insurance
policy limits are acceptable, Posner held, utilizing a central,
extended analogy to a camera store. 7 Even if Posner's argument
were not such a good example of the classic law school concern about
what happens when you let the camera get its nose in the tent, his
102. Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 899 (11th Cir. 1998), affd, Olmstead v. Zimring,
527 U.S. 581 (1999).
103. See Martin, 532 U.S. at 698.
104. 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1106 (2000).
105. Id. at 558 (citing Mutual of Omaha's stipulation).
106. Posner does have a relatively expansive view of the definition of public accommodation
that goes beyond the physical and covers intangibles.
107. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 560.
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focus usefully captures substantial elements of several basic ADA
issues.'0 8
The part of Posner's opinion quoted in Scalia's Martin dissent
first observed: "'The common sense of the statute is that the content
of the goods or services offered by a place of public accommodation
is not regulated."' Perhaps consistent with the postulates of law
and economics, this claim of common sense is otherwise un-
supported. It is also far from obvious within a sweeping regulatory
reform regime such as the ADA. Yet this presumed common sense
baseline turned out to be the key to Posner's answer to the central
question throughout his entire opinion. It turned out to be yet
another challenging Posner Analogy Test.
A. The Camera Lens
Posner's first analogy underscored the limitation he hoped to
impose on the ADA's language: 'A camera store may not refuse to
sell cameras to a disabled person, but it is not required to stock
cameras specially designed for such persons. nO Discretionary
choices by both merchant and market must prevail once access is
guaranteed. To Judge Evans, dissenting, "The better analogy would
be that of a store which lets disabled customers in the door, but then
108. In an article in October 1, 2001 New Yorker, Susan Sontag pointed out that several
authors have noted the melancholy nature of the camera. Susan Sontag, Loving Dostoevsky:
The Recovery of the Novel "Summer in Baden-Baden," THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 1, 2001, at 98.
109. Martin, 532 U.S. at 698 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.
Co., 179 F.3d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 1999)) (admitting that the statutory language is not clear,
contrary to Scalia's general approach, but also remaining unclear as to the source of this
"common sense").
110. Id. at 698 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 560). Scalia
went on to quote more of Posner's majority opinion, joined by Easterbrook:
The common sense of the statute is that the content of the goods or services
offered by a place of public accommodation is not regulated. A camera store may
not refuse to sell cameras to a disabled person, but it is not required to stock
cameras specially designed for such persons. Had Congress purposed to impose
so enormous a burden on the retail sector of the economy and so vast a
supervisory responsibility on the federal courts, we think it would have made its
intention clearer and would at least have imposed some standards. It is hardly
a feasible judicial function to decide whether shoestores should sell single shoes
to one-legged persons and if so at what price, or how many Braille books the
Borders or Barnes and Noble bookstore chains should stock in each of their
stores.
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refuses to sell them anything but inferior cameras.""' Much turns
on which analogy is more apt. Indeed, the distinction Posner sought
to draw turns out to be key beyond his Mutual of Omaha decision.
It also illuminates the arguments among the Justices in Martin and
in other ADA cases, and hints at what a better approach might be.
The "core meaning" of the public accommodation provision in the
ADA is clear, according to Posner."' It is "plainly enough ... that [a
facility] open to the public cannot exclude disabled persons from
entering the facility and, once in, from using the facility in the same
way that the nondisabled do.""' It necessarily follows, Posner
proclaimed, that "[tihe owner or operator of, say, a camera store can
neither bar the door to the disabled nor let them in but then refuse
to sell its cameras to them on the same terms as to other
customers.""' It is noteworthy that Posner-who elsewhere has
insisted on the constitutionally crucial importance of distinguishing
between negative and affirmative guarantees of rights 5-here
perceived no significance to the distinction between a request "that
a limitation be removed rather than that a physical product be
added or altered."1 The lens cap is either on or off. The merchant
is seen only in binary terms-refusing service altogether, or serving
all customers "in the same way" and "on the same terms." Within
the black box of the Common Sense Camera Store, either the
merchant's free choice or the disabled customer's demand must
prevail. There is no middle ground. No accommodation need be
made, despite what the ADA has to say about "reasonable
accommodation" required to provide "full and equal enjoyment."" 7
B. Logging More Analogies
To be sure, Posner's position began to seem more plausible in the
course of two additional analogies he suggested. He immediately
went on to state (and Scalia to quote): "It is hardly a feasible judicial
111. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 565 (Evans, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 559.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987),
affd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
116. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 560.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2000).
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function to decide whether shoestores should sell single shoes to
one-legged persons and if so at what price, or how many Braille
books the Borders or Barnes and Noble bookstore chains should
stock in each of their stores.""1 Thus, Posner identified a twofold
central concern: First, he worried about the burden of an explosion
of cases in the federal courts; and second, he feared that these
judges would be required to make "standardless decisions about the
composition of retail inventories."119 These rather extreme examples
do push us far along the slippery slope of intimate regulation of the
marketplace, backed by unceasing judicial scrutiny. They also
depend, however, on a radical hypothetical leap away from the
stipulated facts in Mutual of Omaha-to say nothing of the glaring
distance of these analogies from insurance, a heavily regulated
industry that deals in products hardly closely akin to the kind of
free market camera shops, shoe stores, and bookstore chains in the
hypotheticals Judge Posner so enjoys.
That said, Posner did go on to concede that the AIDS insurance
caps initially might seem disanalogous to the "refusal to stock" the
special item hypotheticals. 20 This was because a person infected by
HIV who contracted pneumonia faced a very low benefits cap; a
person not infected by HIV would find the costs of treating his
pneumonia fully covered.' 2' Posner observed: "It looks, therefore,
like a difference in treatment referable solely to the fact that one
person is disabled and the other is not."'22 Posner immediately
added, however: "But this is not correct." "s He then offered a
discursus explaining that HIV does not cause, but simply allows,
other opportunistic diseases. Therefore, the AIDS cap actually deals
acceptably with a distinctive disease.124 Convincing or not on this
point, Posner also read the McCarran-Ferguson Act to bar ADA
coverage of such insurance matters.
118. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 560, quoted in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661,
668 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As if small bookstore owners did not have enough trouble
competing with the massive chains, they ought to wonder about such product placement
within a fictional judicial analogy.
119. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 560.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 560.
124. Id. at 561.
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We need not plunge into the intricacies of either AIDS etiology or
insurance law to notice that even Posner seemed to concede a
problem when there is "a difference in treatment referable solely to
the fact that one person is disabled and the other not."1" Thus, he
suggested, an insurance company cannot simply refuse to sell an
insurance policy to a person with AIDS.126
In fact, the Second Circuit has held that such stonewalling-
specifically, the refusal by the Allstate Insurance Company to sell
a joint life insurance policy to a married couple each of whom had
disabilities-violates the ADA's public accommodation protections.
In Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Insurance Co.," Judge Leval held that
Title III, which covers underwriting practices, is not barred by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, and does not impose a burden on the
plaintiff to show the absence of an actuarial basis for the claimed
discrimination.' Nonetheless, the Second Circuit implied-and
that Court and a number of other circuits as well have elsewhere
clearly held-that not all distinctions made on the basis of disability
constitute discrimination banned by the ADA. For example, it is
widely agreed that insurance companies may distinguish between
physical and mental disabilities in establishing benefit policy caps
without violating the ADA.'"
So what, if anything, is wrong with Posner's analogies or his
holding? He proposes tough cases for defenders of ADA coverage.
One need not embrace court-enforced merchandising, however,
to believe that, by passing the ADA, Congress gave previously
unenforced or underenforced dignitary claims made by people with
125. Id. at 560.
126. Id. at 559. Posner mentioned, however, that an insurance company defendant might
be able to plead a special fundamental alteration defense of such a refusal. Id It seems ironic
for Posner, a prolific writer and important thinker who has devoted many pages to the
importance of price in even some of the most improbable settings, not even to suspect that an
artificially low benefit package might be the functional equivalent of a forbidden refusal to
sell.
127. 198 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1999).
128. Id.
129. EEOC v. Staten Island Say. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing numerous
other circuits similarly allowing the distinction). These decisions may be correct. They can be
distinguished from Posner's Mutual of Omaha holding, however, on the basic ground that the
factual predicate for the distinctions as to policy limits advanced by the companies in question
seemed to rest on significant factual differences-a defense undermined in the Seventh
Circuit case by Mutual of Omaha's stipulation, though Posner worked to rehabilitate such a
defense in spite of the record.
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disabilities at least a practical leg to stand on (as it were) in their
search for full and equal treatment with the rest of society. Nor is
it necessary to speculate about how many Braille volumes must be
on the shelves to perceive that an unmarked pitfall on the
floor-though equally unmarked for all customers-still might
violate the ADA rights of a blind customer.
Another analogy, discussed by Judge Evans in his dissent in
Mutual of Omaha, further clarifies the matter. Evans wrote:
We are not being asked to force a restaurant to alter its menu to
accommodate disabled diners; we are being asked to stop a
restaurant that is offering to its nondisabled diners a menu
containing a variety of entrees while offering a menu with only
limited selections to its disabled patrons. "o
As a result of the insurance company's stipulation indicating no
rational basis for the benefits cap distinction and because of the
harm done to people with disabilities, Evans' analogy seems more
apt than Posner's comparison to even-handed treatment by camera
shops, shoe stores, and bookstore chains.1 31
It is as if, in the context of AIDS, Mutual of Omaha is offering not
an inferior camera, but one with which one can only "pretend" to
take pictures. An insurance policy with an AIDS cap seems even
less an insurance policy for an AIDS victim than a golf tournament
without a cart is a fair competition for Casey Martin. Martin can
still play all eighteen holes-he just will not win. TheAIDS victim,
however, cannot make it past the second hole.132 In rejecting the
PGA's claims, one might hope the Supreme Court is rejecting
Posner's insurance analogies as well. This seems somewhat of a
stretch, however, no matter how clear the Martin majority was in
130. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 565 (Evans, J., dissenting). Finding the appropriate
analogy is an important part of the legal craft, of course, as is distinguishing among different
ways people may be legally "forced" to do things they would prefer not to do.
131. It is apparent that Posner did not approve of the stipulation, which he explained as
an element of the company's trial strategy: trying to win big even with the stipulation, but
having available the possibility of case-by-case attrition if the initial defense failed. Mutual
of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 564. Indeed, Posner tried hard to distinguish away the stipulation
itself in the course of his medical discussion.
132. I am grateful to Tom Baker, who is the Connecticut Mutual Professor and the Director
of the Insurance Law Center at the University of Connecticut School of Law, for his helpful
discussion of these insurance law issues.
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rejecting Scalia's stridency and his slippery sloping greens. Yet this
battle of analogies itself underscores the complexity and significance
of attention to the connections and distinctions among "same,"
"equal," and "full" rights, as well as the issue of "reasonable
accommodation" to which we now turn.
IV. THE COURT'S 2001 TERM: STRICT DECONSTRUCTION, SUMMARY
INJUSTICE?
The ADA unquestionably includes a good deal of ambiguity, some
purposeful and some not. Professors Silvers and Stein convincingly
argued recently, for example, that Congress' decision to copy the
ADA's central definition of "disability" from the Rehabilitation Act
of 1974'1 had substantial and unfortunate consequences.1 34 The
ADA blurred some important distinctions between individuals in
need of rehabilitation and individuals with varying capabilities for
whom the ADA sought "to assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency."'
35
Repeatedly, in its formal statement of findings and purposes, as well
as in debates and the statutory language ultimately adopted,
Congress identified and sought to remedy the impact of past
discrimination, both purposeful and unintentional, on people with
disabilities. A pervasive theme, in fact, was that discrimination
persists in a broad range of "critical areas," including the first one
listed: "employment."
136
By lifting its disability definition wholesale from the
Rehabilitation Act, however, Congress somewhat muddled what has
become a key distinction between being substantially limited in a
major life activity (such as performing manual tasks) and being
133. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). See generally Burgdorf, supra note 78 (analyzing the ADA from
its drafters' point of view).
134. Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the Supreme
Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional
Classification, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 81 (Fall 2001/Winter 2002).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000). For a cogent, critical description of the "independent
living" component of the ADA, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act
as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921 (2003).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(aX3). It is impossible to look at Title I in its entirety and not to see
that the thrust of the entire Title is employment discrimination. As discussed below, however,
the Court's manipulations of definitions at the threshold of "disability" have managed to cast
doubt on whether "working" is even within the scope of the Act's coverage.
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capable of performing social functions (such as working). That
confusion, unpacked convincingly by Silvers and Stein, has allowed
the Court to whipsaw both the major life activity and the working
elements of ADA protections. Defendants now enjoy virtually an
open season when they challenge any individual's self-identification
as a disabled person. The dignity of persons with disabilities is
vitiated, if not forgotten. Moreover, the substantial and significant
overlap between antidiscrimination and accommodation is buried
under an avalanche of purportedly clear "either/or" choices imposed
by the Court.
137
In fact, with powerful assistance from the Court's rewriting of the
ADA, defendants have become remarkably successful in resisting
and defeating ADA claims. 13 Definitional circularities, expansive
use of summary judgment, and various other threshold legal
maneuvers now allow judges to push Title I disability claims
quickly out of court. Virtually lost in the shuffle is recognition that
"Congress passed the ADA primarily because it saw the system-
atically inferior treatment of disabled people as rising to the level of
unconstitutional discrimination." 39
Brief consideration of the Court's four ADA decisions during its
2001 Term will demonstrate the basic inconsistencies in the Court's
approach. It also will suggest that the Justices continue to struggle
against the ADA's emphasis on the importance of work. Finally, in
137. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642
(2001).
138. See Bagenstos, supra note 135, at 923 & n.1.
139. Silvers & Stein, supra note 134, at 111. The internal inconsistencies within the
Supreme Court's interpretation of how to determine if someone meets the statutory definition
for disability are quite stark. I discussed elsewhere some of the deep incongruities within
earlier decisions by the Court that essentially rewrite the ADA. These include determining
that only one of Congress' findings must be given weight-and then aggressively read against
the grain of Congress' large number of expansive findings-and emphasizing that an
"individualized inquiry" is "mandated by the ADA." Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471, 483 (1999). Otherwise, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Sutton warned, "persons
often must be treated as members of a group of people, with similar impairments, rather than
as individuals." Id. at 483-84. Yet for all its rhetoric about individual treatment, the Court
also has held: (1) that the person claiming to be disabled must demonstrate that she fits
within some recognized category defined as disabled; and (2) that any job discrimination she
encounters actually must affect a class of jobs stretching far beyond the particular type of job
she seeks or wants to keep. Moreover, she must remain disabled even if she mitigates her
disability naturally or with assistance. The decisions that established such a hologram of
individual/group perceptions, however, in fact failed to consider the actual contexts of the
particular individuals before the Court. See Soifer, supra note 14, at 1300-12.
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what might pass as a technical explication of available remedies, the
Court in Gorman actually returned to and expanded upon some of
the worst aspects of Garrett.
A. Work
1. Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams: ° "Performing
Tasks That Are of Central Importance to Most People's Daily
Lives"'
The problems Ella Williams had at her job seem rather typical,
though she may have been a bit more willing to pursue her rights
than are most employees. Williams began working in Toyota's
manufacturing plant in Kentucky in the summer of 1990, soon after
the ADA was adopted. She developed pain in her hands, wrists, and
arms, and so Toyota assigned her modified duties. After a few
conflicts over her health and her need for work restrictions,
Williams apparently worked uneventfully in Quality Control
Inspection Operations [QCIO] for three years. In 1996, however,
Toyota decided that workers in QCIO should rotate through all four
of the unit's processes. Williams began to experience pain once
again, and she sought an accommodation to allow her to return to
performing only the two QCIO processes that did not require much
lifting or manual labor. Toyota refused; soon Williams lost her job.42
The district court granted summary judgment to Toyota. Williams
had failed to persuade the judge that her physical impairment
might qualify as a disability because, as the District Judge noted,
her impairment had not "substantially limited" any "major life
activity."143 The Sixth Circuit reversed, believing that Williams
could "show that her manual disability involved a 'class' of manual
activities affecting the ability to perform tasks at work."'" The
Supreme Court unanimously rejected that standard and reversed
140. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
141. Id. at 187.
142. There is some dispute about what occurred during December of 1996, but Williams
sued under the ADA challenging both the failure to accommodate and the termination of her
employment, as well as on other grounds. Id. at 189-90.
143. Id. at 191 (quoting unpublished district court opinion that quoted, in turn, the ADA's
disability definition at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2XA) (2000)).
144. Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 224 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2000).
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the Sixth Circuit.'45 The reasons given by Justice O'Connor for the
Court are quite revealing.
Once again, the Court first bounced around a good deal, picking
and choosing among regulations promulgated by various federal
agencies charged to interpret and apply the ADA and its
predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1974.'" Justice O'Connor also
provided a direct reprise of the Court's heavy reliance on dictionary
definitions to understand what Congress intended in its disability
definition references to a substantial (e.g., "considerable" or
"essential") limit on one or more of the major (e.g., "important") life
activities. 4 7 After knocking down a strawperson-"[m]erely having
an impairment does not make one disabled for purposes of the
ADA"'"-the Court used its selective smattering of dictionary
definitions as sole support for a major logical leap: 'Major life
activities' thus refers to those activities that are of central
importance to daily life."149 But in an individualized inquiry, how
145. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 202-03.
146. Grudgingly, the Court again accepted for purposes of this case, explicitly and pointedly
without deciding, that the EEOC regulations at stake were reasonable. Id. at 194. On the very
next page, however, when the EEOC regulations were closer to where the Court wished to go,
O'Connor quoted at length from the EEOC's regulation, describing the definition of
"substantially limited" as "[ulnable to perform a major life activity that the average person in
the general population can perform." Id. at 195-96 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 196-97 (relying on Webster's Third New International Dictionary and on the
second edition of the Oxford English Dictionary). Actually "substantial" and "major" wind up
sounding almost synonymous, particularly as Justice O'Connor quite selectively quoted from
the dictionary sources she chose in order to make both words appear to require showings of
very substantial, and even "essential" limitations on a person's capabilities. The best she
could do with "major" actually was to quote a Webster's International comparative definition:
"greater in dignity, rank, importance, or interest," and O'Connor herself added "important."
148. Id. at 195.
149. Id. at 197. Even if Webster's International were the best source for determining the
meaning of a statute, O'Connor's prestidigitation is striking. A dictionary "greater" becomes
the Court's "important" which-with the addition of a "thus'-has "central" added to the
definition. To notice this wordplay is not a mere quibble. Indeed, the essence of the Court's
holding in Toyota emerges in the very next sentence, in which the added "central" has become
mandatory, a prerequisite for fitting into the ADA's definition of being disabled. To quote in
full: "In order for performing manual tasks to fit into this category-a category that includes
such basic abilities as walking, seeing, and hearing-the manual tasks in question must be
central to daily life." Id. As if saying something enough makes it so, the Court repeated that
"the central inquiry" now "must be whether the claimant is unable to perform the variety of
tasks central to most people's daily lives" at both the beginning and the end of its opinion. Id.
at 185, 200. Who said the center could not hold?
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can anyone measure what is of central importance unless one takes
an individual at his or her word?
The Court offered a surprising answer. It was premised
exclusively on a remarkable rule of construction: "[tihat these terms
need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for
qualifying .... "'" The only support the Court claimed for its miserly
approach to an important civil rights statute was that otherwise too
many Americans might be covered.15' But the Court did not stop
there. It made another breathtaking leap, relying on a telltale
"therefore," this time in place of a "thus." O'Connor followed her
discussion of the perils of the numerical slippery slope with: "We
therefore hold that to be substantially limited in performing manual
tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or
severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of
central importance in most people's daily lives."5 2
So how do we provide the individual assessment mandated by the
ADA? Apparently through use of a blunt, massively group-oriented
reference point, through comparison for example, to what is
presumed to be of central importance in the daily lives of "most
people."" 3 When it comes to the ADA, the much-touted virtues of
150. Id. at 197. According to O'Connor, this parsimonious definitional approach "is
confirmed by the first section of the ADA," citing § 12101 and emphasizing Congress' estimate
of forty-three million Americans with one or more physical or mental disabilities in §
12101(aX1). Id. O'Connor played the numbers game before in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471, 487 (1999), and it was unconvincing there, too. See Soifer, supra note 14, at
1305-06. To read all of§ 12101 of the ADA, which contains Congress' "Findings and Purposes,"
is to see that if Congress' sweeping language confirms anything, it is actually the opposite of
O'Connor's pinched rule of construction. The Queen of Hearts in Lewis Carroll's Alice in
Wonderland comes to mind. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND (Donald J. Gray ed.,
W.W. Norton & Co., 2d ed. 1992).
151. Here again, as she had for the Court in Sutton, O'Connor relied on Congress' estimate
of forty-three million Americans with one or more physical or mental disabilities and argued
that the number would have been higher if a more generous definition were employed. Sutton,
527 U.S. at 487. There are numerous fallacies in this argument, not least of which is that even
people who might technically be defined as disabled also might not choose to define
themselves that way or to invoke the ADA for a variety of reasons. That all Americans
theoretically can claim the protections of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for example, because all Americans
are said to be of some race and to be protected from racial discrimination under color of state
law does not mean that "race" or § 1983 must be "interpreted strictly to create a demanding
standard for qualifying" under the statute. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.
152. Id. at 198. The impairment also must be either permanent or long-term, according to
the Court.
153. Earlier in her opinion, O'Connor approvingly quoted several EEOC definitions that
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sticking to the text, restraining judicial activism, and assuring
accountability by decision makers seem simply to melt away.
Indeed, just when it seemed that the Justices could -not possibly
slice the bologna any thinner, they managed to do so again in
Toyota.
The Sixth Circuit understandably believed after Sutton that
"substantially limits" requires a showing of limits in a "class" of
activities. The Supreme Court disagreed. Sutton did require "that
plaintiffs allege that they are unable to work in a broad class of
jobs;"'54 the Sutton twins' ADA claim did not fly because they had
not anticipated and did not satisfy that requirement. "But," the
Court now explained, "Sutton did not suggest that a class-based
analysis should be applied to any major life activity other than
working."' Moreover, the Court reiterated its concern about "the
conceptual difficulties inherent in the argument that working could
be a major life activity" and determined not to decide "this difficult
question."'56 It is a difficult question only because of the Court's
interventions. The ADA hardly anticipated complicated litigation
and massive barriers at the definitional stage of disability claims.
Indeed, Title I is almost entirely about employment and the
workplace. And one must wonder if there is much doubt even using
the Court's new ADA benchmark-what "most people" believe-
concerning whether working is a major life activity.
The Sixth Circuit had not relied on "working," however. It found
instead that Williams had substantial limits in her ability to do
manual tasks associated only with her job. "This was error," the
Justices announced. In referring to a "class of manual activities,"
the Sixth Circuit had been overly broad; but in considering manual
employ an "average person in the general population" standard. Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
One is left to wonder whether the Court's subsequent move from "average" to "most people"
is attributable to the Court's intention to raise the ante, or if it represents statistical or
linguistic sloppiness.
154. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491.
155. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200. That issue was not before the Court in Sutton.
156. Id. at 200. The Sutton Court assumed, only for purposes of that decision, that working
can constitute a major life activity. In Sutton's companion case, Albertson's, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999), however, the Court simply assumed without discussion that
working is a major life activity. The Court then disposed of the disability claim on other
threshold grounds. Indeed, the Toyota Court mentioned in passing that Title I "deals with
employment ..... Toyota, 534 U.S. at 201. It would seem hard to understand how "working"
could possibly be excluded from its basic definition of disability.
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tasks associated with Williams' job, the Court of Appeals had been
too narrow. The Court insisted that the crucial inquiry about an
activity must be measured in terms of whether it is "central to most
people's daily lives, not whether the claimant is unable to perform
the tasks associated with her specific job.""5 7 So much for Congress'
evident effort throughout Title I to protect persons with disabilities
from discrimination in employment. So much for the "individualized
inquiry mandated by the ADA." 58
2. US Airways v. Barnett:'59 "Preferences Will Sometimes Prove
Necessary to Achieve the [ADA's] Basic Equal Opportunity Goal" 1"°
The Court was dramatically divided in Barnett, in sharp contrast
to its unanimous agreement at least as to the results in the other
ADA decisions under discussion. Yet the Barnett Court's treatment
of the ADA was much less technically intricate. The Court's sharp
divisions turned instead on the issues of how to define "neutrality,"
and how much the ADA might be understood to have changed the
workplace.
157. Id. at 200-01. The Court simply asserted that Williams' inability to do the manual
tasks required at work---"repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder
levels for extended periods of time ... is not an important part of most people's lives." Id. at
201. Additionally, the Court seemed to go out of its way to stress the variability of impairment
caused by carpal tunnel syndrome. Id. at 199.
Yet itwas only by refraining the issue entirely-the disability definition is not really about
work, it is about a wide range of other manual tasks-that the Court plausibly could claim
a measure of support from what is important in "most people's daily lives." Indeed, O'Connor
scolded the Sixth Circuit for not examining other manual tasks such as "household chores,
bathing, and brushing one's teeth" which are, she proclaimed, "among the types of manual
tasks of central importance to people's daily lives." Id. at 202. As a bald person who has many
friends-both women and men-with short hair (or less), I wonder if daily hair-brushing
meets the standard; at times, I'm not even sure how high daily bathing ranks among my
fellow Americans on the central importance meter, notwithstanding the Court's specific
assurance on the matter.
158. See supra note 150. Of course, Title I does not say that persons with disabilities should
always get or keep the jobs they seek. Rather it clearly calls for a contextual inquiry about
what is or is not a "reasonable accommodation," taking into account the burden on the
employer as well as the burden on the employee. The following discussion of the Court's
decisions in Barnett and Echazabal analyzes this element of the ADA and explores some of
the Court's choices among competing values. See infra Parts II.A.2. and II.A.3.
159. 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
160. Id. at 1521.
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Justice Breyer's lead opinion-which prevailed only because
Justice O'Connor voted to join so as to avoid a stalemate' 61-sought
pragmatic middle ground under the ADA for "unprejudiced thought
and reasonable responsive reaction on the part of employers and
fellow workers alike."62 That ground became a battlefield within the
Court, however, primarily because Breyer insisted that the ADA's
"reasonable accommodation" requirement sometimes would require
an employer to do more than simply to insist on applying a neutral
rule or practice.
John Barnett, a long-time employee of US Airways and one of its
predecessor airlines, injured his back while working as a cargo-
handler in 1990. He was able to transfer to a less physically
demanding mailroom position, where he worked for two years. Upon
learning that the position was to become open to seniority bidding
and that two more senior employees planned to bid for the job,
Barnett asked for an accommodation that would allow him to
remain working in the mailroom. US Airways eventually decided to
make no exception for him, and Barnett lost his job. Barnett then
filed suit under the ADA, claiming that its requirement of a
"reasonable accommodation" ought to prevail over a seniority
system unilaterally imposed by his employer.' 63
Without delving deeply into the intricacies of the divisions with-
in the Court, two elements of Breyer's plurality opinion stand
out. First, Breyer's view of the ADA emphasized that even neutral
161. Justice Breyer was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy. Justice
Stevens also joined Breyer's opinion, but he filed a concurrence, emphasizing how sparse the
record was and what he saw as the issues and the burden upon remand. Justice O'Connor also
joined but, quoting Justice Rutledge's concurrence in the famously divided Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), expressed significant doubts as to whether the position in question
was "vacant" and whether the seniority system imposed by US Airways was legally
enforceable. Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Justice Thomas, and simply would have
deferred to the seniority system. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, read the ADA to
trump the seniority system in place at US Airways and thus also dissented.
162. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1523.
163. The district court granted summary judgment, holding that interfering with the
airline's seniority system would cause it "undue hardship," an ADA standard that overcomes
"reasonable accommodation." The Ninth Circuit reversed, en banc, regarding the seniority
system as only "a factor" in the undue hardship analysis and calling for an intensive case-by-
case inquiry to assess undue hardship. See Barnett v. US Airways, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105 (9th
Cir. 2000). It bears noting that none of the Justices questioned whether Barnett's back injury
actually disabled him at the definitional threshold, under the criteria established by the
unanimous Toyota decision a few months before.
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employment rules-such as neutral rules governing office assign-
ments or furniture budgets-actually can automatically operate to
prevent the "reasonable accommodation" mandated by the ADA. To
satisfy the ADA, in Breyer's opinion, "preferences will sometimes
prove necessary to achieve the Act's basic equal opportunity goal."1"
This caveat regarding inherent limitations within formal neu-
trality is important in itself. It also resonates directly with some of
the Court's most important constitutional battles in recent years.
In the Cleveland school voucher case, for example, Chief Justice
Rehnquist insisted that the challenged voucher plan did not violate
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because, as he
repeated over and over, it was "neutral in all respects toward
religion."165 With considerable passion, the dissenters took the
majority to task for its use of the particular categories of funded
programs that Rehnquist considered in order to declare the plan
neutral, as well as for his use of "neutrality" in what they regarded
as an inaccurately unified abstraction.1 66 Much of the roiling debate
about "affirmative action" also continues to revolve around issues of
neutrality and questions about when and if preferences may or
should count.
Second, Barnett is noteworthy for the plurality's description of the
main purpose of the ADA. Breyer wrote in terms quite difficult to
reconcile with the vision of the ADA described in Toyota-a decision
in which all the Justices joined. According to the plurality in
Barnett, the ADA's "primary purpose" is to seek "to diminish or to
eliminate the stereotypical thought processes, the thoughtless
actions, and the hostile reactions that far too often bar those with
disabilities from participating fully in the Nation's life, including the
workplace."167 Further, Breyer continued, these objectives "will
164. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1521. Under the ADA, to obtain the "same workplace
opportunities that those without disabilities automatically enjoy," those with disabilities are
guaranteed "reasonable accommodation" preferences. Id.
165. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002). For example, Rehnquist claimed
that the aid plan is "neutral in all respects" and "entirely neutral." Id. at 2467, 2473. The
second main prong of the majority's analysis involved its repeated assertion that the aid
recipients--the parents participating in the voucher program--could make "true private
choices," thereby adequately insulating aid to religious institutions from state involvement.
Id. at 2466-68.
166. See, e.g., id. at 2485 (Souter, J., dissenting).
167. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1522-23.
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sometimes require affirmative conduct to promote entry of disabled
people into the workforce.""' Following the "practical way" that
many lower courts have tried to reconcile the burdens of "reasonable
accommodation" and "undue hardship," the Court described a
litigation process. To defeat a summary judgment motion, a
plaintiff/employee need only show that an accommodation seems
reasonable on its face. If a plaintiff can make this showing, then the
defendant/employer must show "special (typically case-specific)
circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular
circumstances."169 Ironically, however, in applying this new test, the
plurality went on to hold that an accommodation that interferes
with an existing seniority system is, by definition, "ordinarily" not
"reasonable."7 °
Breyer's enthusiasm for what he described as the predictability
and relative fairness of seniority systems-even when imposed by
the employer-points to a neutrality concern at another level, again
involving deeply controversial but also basic issues.'71 There seems
168. Id. at 1523. He added, perhaps unnecessarily (or perhaps as his response to Souter's
dissent), "(tiheydo not, however, demand action beyond the realm of the reasonable." Id. Just
before, Breyer had insisted that "reasonable" did not mean "effective," but he went on to
assert that, in "ordinary English," "accommodation" does convey the need for effectiveness.
Id. at 1522.
169. Id at 1523. This procedure echoes that used in Title VII, and it is an echo that makes
considerable sense in the ADA context, though it unfortunately has not been much followed.
See Silvers & Stein, supra note 134, at 123-24.
170. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1524. In emphasizing the advantages of seniority systems,
Breyer relied on lower court cases construing collectively bargained seniority systems, but he
extended his deference to unilaterally imposed seniority systems as well. Id. Claiming a
number of "relevant seniority system advantages," the plurality then returned the burden to
the plaintiff/employee to show "special circumstances" weighty enough to make any proposed
exception to an existing seniority system a "reasonable accommodation" under the particular
circumstances of the case. Id. at 1524.25.
171. Even when ADA claimants manage to eke out some extremely narrow protection from
the Supreme Court, however, they seem to be left with a very heavy practical burden to meet.
In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), for example, Justice
Breyer's unanimous opinion allowed a person who claimed to be completely disabled from
working for purposes of Social Security Disability Income (SSDI) to claim later that she was
capable of working for purposes of the ADA. As Anita Silvers and Michael Stein have
explained, however, the Court actually mixed factual and legal inquiries and managed to
create a "stipulation of counterfactual coextensivity .... " Silvers & Stein, supra note 134, at
131; see also Anita Silvers & Michael Stein, From Plessy (1896) and Goesart (1948) to
Cleburne (1985) and Garrett (2001): A Chill Wind From the Past Blows Equal Protection
Away, in BAcKLASH AGAINST THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES AcT: REINTERPRETING
DISArnLrrY RIGHTS (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2002).
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to be something about the ADA, however, that permits the Court to
ignore some of its own leading analogous precedents.
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,'72 for example, a
divided Court struck down a collectively bargained plan governing
school layoffs. The union had voted repeatedly to modify a straight
seniority plan so that minority teachers would not be laid off as
quickly as white teachers, and the school board agreed to the plan.
In striking down this arrangement as a racial classification that was
invalid on equal protection grounds, Justice Powell's plurality
opinion stressed the vital importance of keeping a job.7 ' In this
sense, Wygant seems to support Barnett's deep commitment to
seniority systems of all kinds, but it also seems to disagree with
Toyota's denigration of the importance of working. Yet Powell also
expressed concern that more senior union members were likely to
support a plan that would not directly affect them, and he conceded
that seniority systems could be modified in the interest of
fairness. 17 Indeed, even Wygant's emphatic disagreement with the
use of racial classifications to advance "affirmative action" goals
without a sufficient factual predicate indicated that the result would
be different if the relevant employer had a demonstrated history of
past discrimination. In passing the ADA, Congress specifically found
extensive evidence of past discrimination against people with
disabilities.
75
It is well past time for the Court to acknowledge the patterns and
practices of past discrimination by employers against people with
disabilities. Barnett's ready acceptance of seniority-absent special
172. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
173.
Even a temporary layoff may have adverse financial as well as psychological
effects. A worker may invest many productive years in one job and one city with
the expectation of earning the stability and security of seniority. 'At that point,
the rights and expectations surrounding seniority make up what is probably the
most valuable capital asset that the worker "owns," worth even more than the
current equity in his home.... Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way
that general hiring goals do not.
Id. at 283 (quoting Fallon & Weiler, Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 SUP. CT. REV.
1,58).
174. Id. at 282.
175. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)5, § 12101(a)7, § 12101(aX9) (2000). These sections
prompted Congress' statement of the ADA's purpose as "a categorical antidiscrimination
directive by the federal government on behalf of disabled Americans." Silvers & Stein, supra
note 134, at 113.
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circumstances-seems to invite litigation to demonstrate such
special circumstances. The kicker, however, is that workplace
discrimination against persons with disabilities remains pervasive.
A proven history of employment discrimination, therefore, could be
dismissed by the current Court with a classic Catch-22 argument,
i.e., that such a pattern does not constitute a "special circumstance"
at all. Justice Scalia's dissent in Barnett accused the plurality of
"[ilndulging its penchant for eschewing clear rules that might avoid
litigation."7 ' Of course, "the disabled plaintiff will lose" is a clear
rule.
3. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal:'" Workplace Paternalism
and a Specifically Demonstrated Risk
In Echazabal, the Court again unanimously reversed a court of
appeals decision, this time because the Ninth Circuit questioned the
authority of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to promulgate a regulation under the ADA allowing an
employer to refuse to hire an individual if, due to disability, the
individual's job performance might pose a direct threat to his own
health. Mario Echazabal worked for an independent contractor in
a Chevron oil refinery beginning in 1972. His legal troubles began,
however, when he twice attempted to work directly for Chevron. The
first time Echazabal was offered a job by Chevron, he failed a
required physical examination due to a liver abnormality.
Echazabal continued to work for the independent contractor,
however, and his duties continued to take him into the section of the
refinery believed to be most dangerous to someone with his liver
condition. When Echazabal tried to work directly for Chevron a
second time, he again was offered a job if he could pass the physical.
Again he failed, and this time Chevron instructed Echazabal's
employer to reassign him or to remove him from the plant.
Echazabal soon was laid off and filed suit in state court claiming,
among other things, that Chevron had violated the ADA.178
176. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. at 1528 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002).
178. Id. at 2047-48. Chevron removed the case to federal court and insisted that
Echazabal's health problem, which ultimately had been diagnosed as Hepatitis C, made the
job he sought a direct threat to his health. The company relied on an EEOC regulation, 29
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Justice Souter's unanimous opinion unpacked the ADA's affir-
mative defense of "business necessity."179 The ADA described the
defense as "a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the work-
place.""s Souter made a strong case, however, that it was plausible
for the EEOC to extend the defense to threats to oneself, as well as
to others not in the workplace.
18 1
Most significantly for our purposes, the Court also sought to
distinguish between the ADA's clear rejection of "workplace
paternalism"'82 and the individualized inquiry into "specific and
documented risks to the employee himself' 8 that the Court
found permissible under the ADA. Yet drawing a line between
acceptable and unacceptable paternalism is deeply problematic,8 '
as is defining acceptable "individualized risk assessments."
The Court attempted to distinguish Title VII gender cases in
which the Court rejected company rules that purported to protect
C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2001), for its claim that a direct threat to an employee's own health
would suffice as an ADA defense. See Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2047-48.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2000); id. § 12112(b)(6).
180. Id. § 12113(b).
181. Souter specifically listed three strikes against Echazabal's claim. First, he argued that
the statute stated an example, rather than a list, so that the canon "expressio unius exclusio
alterius,' 'expressing one item of [an] associated group or series excludes another left
unmentioned,'" did not apply. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2049. Second, he rejected the idea that
the omission could be attributed to unequivocal congressional intent. He specifically referred
to interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act that he claimed Congress intended to adopt in the
ADA. Id. at 2050. Third, mentioning Typhoid Mary, he argued that Congress could not have
meant to allow a worker's disability to threaten others not in the workplace. Id. at 2051.
182. Id. at 2053. Souter approvingly summarized the EEOC's interpretation of the ADA's
policy aimed at employers' "refusals to give an even break to classes of disabled people, while
claiming to act for their own good in reliance on untested and pretextual stereotypes." Id. at
2052. He also described Congress' policy as providing "a disabled individual's right to operate
on equal terms within the workplace." Id.
183. Id. at 2053. Actually there was a significant dispute about Echazabal's medical
condition. See infra text accompanying note 192. The record also suggests some doubt about
whether Chevron acted entirely out of benevolent paternalism. For example, the company
continued to allow Echazabal to do work for an independent contractor in its refinery after
a company doctor rejected Echazabal for ajob with Chevron on medical grounds, and Chevron
even offered him the job a second time, if he could pass the physical exam.
184. It has been troublesome for a long time, and played a crucial role during the heyday
of the Court's interventions against government regulations on behalf of "liberty of contract."
See Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United
States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 L. & HIST. REv. 249 (1987).
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women and potential fetuses. 85 Souter claimed that excluding
women from jobs deemed too risky was different and "beside the
point," because those policies "were concerned with paternalistic
judgments based on the broad category of gender .... "186 But the
decisions he cited also turned on the importance of allowing each
individual employee to assess risk for herself.18 7 "[Women as
capable of doing their jobs as their male counterparts may not be
forced to choose" based on risk to themselves or their fetuses. l8 Why
are the rules different for a person with a disability who is as
capable of doing the job as a nondisabled person, except for some
notion of paternalism?
The Court's reliance on a "particularized enquiry into the harms
the employee would probably face''89 and its other statements
stressing"individualized assessment"' might resolve some doubts.
By now we know that the Court is willing to accept sweeping
generalizations-such as vague assumptions about what is "of
central importance to most people's daily lives-as the measure in
an individualized assessment.'9 ' (After Toyota, it also is not clear
why the Court seemed simply to assume that Echazabal fit the
Court's definition of "disability" in the context of employment). In
reversing the Ninth Circuit, moreover, and remanding without
185. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2053 n.5. The two cases cited were Automobile Workers v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,202 (1991) and Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,335
(1977). See Silvers & Stein, supra note 134, for an insightful discussion of the overlap between
the Court's older approach to gender bias, symbolized by Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948), and its current approach to disability issues. This article directly anticipated many of
the pitfalls the Court failed to notice in Echazabal.
186. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2053 n.5.
187. After asserting that "the purpose of Title VII (is] to allow the individual woman to
make that choice [the acceptability of risk in a particular job] for herself," Dothard actually
upheld a gender restriction based on the claim that requiring prison guards to be male was
a bona fide occupational qualification. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335. And Johnson Controls also
emphasized individual choice repeatedly in the course of striking down the employer's "fetal
protection plan." Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 207. For example, Justice Blackmun's
majority opinion stressed that "(d]ecisions about the welfare of future children must be left
to the parents who conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than to the employers who
hire those parents." Id. Justice Blackmun read the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to require
that "the decision to become pregnant or to work while being either pregnant or capable of
becoming pregnant was reserved for each individual woman to make for herself." Id.
188. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 204.
189. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2053.
190. Id.
191. See discussion supra notes 140-58 and accompanying text.
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additional instructions, the Court accepted the district court's grant
of summary judgment. The district court, however, had decided the
matter despite the
two medical witnesses [who] disputed Chevron's judgment that
Echazabal's liver function was impaired and subject to further
damage under the job conditions in the refinery ... that
Echazabal raised no genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the company acted reasonably in relying on its own doctors'
medical advice, regardless of its accuracy."9 2
Echazabal thus offers a sobering paradigm for what constitutes an
"individualized risk assessment." It is: employer knows best. Even
if inaccurate, his judgment will be accepted. The Court thus seemed
to accept just the kind of broad paternalistic judgments it tried to
distinguish in Echazabal.
4. Play (and Some Dire Consequences)
Jeffrey Gorman managed to get into a fight with a bouncer in a
Kansas City nightclub, and it appears he lost. Police then arrested
him on trespass charges. Gorman, a paraplegic and a wheelchair
user who did not have voluntary control of his lower torso, needed
a catheter attached to a urine bag. The police van was not equipped
to handle a wheelchair. A series of painful, harmful, and emba-
rrassing mistakes ensued, including the rupturing of Gorman's
urine bag and an injury to his shoulder and back, as a police officer
transported Gorman to the police station. Gorman suffered serious
medical problems, and was no longer able to work full time. He
sued Kansas City police officials and officers, claiming they had
discriminated against him in violation of the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act.'93 Ajury awarded Gorman more than $1 million
in compensatory damages and $1.2 million in punitive damages.
The district court vacated the punitive damages award, but the
Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that punitive damages are
available under the two statutes.
194
192. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2048.
193. Barnes v. Gorman, 122 S. Ct. 2097, 2099-100 (2002).
194. Id. at 2100.
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The Court reversed, emphasizing the Spending Power link
between federal norms and Kansas City's receipt of federal funds.
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court involved a series of analogies
and concluded that "appropriate relief' in a discrimination suit
against a public entity under the ADA does not include punitive
damages."' 5 The key, according to Scalia, was that if Congress uses
its Spending Power to impose conditions on state and local
governments, those conditions are to be considered in the nature of
a contract. 96 Thus, the Court held, such conditions must be un-
ambiguous. The acceptance by the state or locality has to be clearly
knowing and voluntary.197
Scalia, extending the contract analogy, held that Kansas City was
not clearly on notice of potential liability for punitive damages.
Therefore, the jury's punitive damages award could not be upheld.1 9
195. Id. at 2100-03. The relevant section of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2000), refers to the
Rehabilitation Act's remedial provision, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(aX2) (2000), which in turn refers to
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. Though Title VI long ago
was held to imply a private cause of action, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979), the Court has been chopping away at the effectiveness of such lawsuits. See, e.g.,
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that Title VI did not allow a private
lawsuit challenging disparate-impact discrimination,' thereby allowing Alabama to
differentiate in drivers' license tests, for example, between people illiterate in English, for
whom accommodation was available, and those illiterate in other languages, who were not
allowed to take the test).
196. Barnes, 122 S. Ct. at 2100-01.
197. Id. at 2101. The Court's expression of great concern about how knowing and voluntary
the consent by these government entities must have been contrasts with its frequent refusal
to scrutinize the knowing and voluntary quality of consent by those who tend to have less
legal advice and to be less sophisticated. See, e.g., Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 122
S. Ct. 1230 (2002) (upholding expulsion of grandmothers, for example, from public housing
because of drug use by their grandchildren outside the housing area, emphasizing that the
grandmothers had signed leases long before that permitted such a remedy against them).
198. Barnes, 122 S. Ct. at 2101-02. Because no implicit consent could be discovered within
traditional contract law terms, the Court believed it followed that Kansas City did not consent
to punitive damages liability, and would not have done so. Scalia emphasized the economic
nature of remedies for third-party beneficiaries in the Spending Power context, and made no
mention of the dignitary harms that tend to accompany being the victim of official
discriminatory conduct. Id. at 2102. There is thus a dramatic contrast to the Court's recent
aggressive interventions in the name of the dignity of the states. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n
v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1874 (2002). Scalia's decision to reverse the jury's
decision also suggests somewhat less faith in the legal acumen of Kansas City residents than
Scalia proclaimed when he argued that "nine people picked at random from the Kansas City
telephone directory" were just as qualified as the Justices to make determinations about
continuing life-support for a person in a persistent vegetative state. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't
of Health, 497 U.S. 261,293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Once again, individualized assessment under the ADA turned out
to be complicated. Congress' central concern with discrimination in
passing the ADA again carried little weight with the Court. The
Court also returned to the Garrett theme of protecting local govern-
ment from its citizens.
V. To TREAT UNLIKE CASES ACCORDINGLY: THE DILEMMA OF
DIFFERENCE AND THE GUARANTEE OF FULL AND EQUAL
OPPORTUNITIES
A. A Vessel for All Seekers
From our personal lives, we know that at times it is crucial to
treat all family members the same, but at times it is essential to
treat each family member differently. The "dilemma of difference,"
compellingly described and analyzed by Martha Minow,"' pervades
societal judgments as well. Paradoxically, as Minow put it:
The stigma of difference may be recreated both by ignoring and
by focusing on it.
The dilemma of difference grows from the ways in which
this society assigns individuals to categories and, on that basis,
determines whom to include in and whom to exclude from
political, social, and economic activities.'
Sometimes, in fact, treating everyone the same way can be so
wrongheaded as to be fatal. A chilling example occurred in the
immediate wake of World War II. According to official State
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, concurred only in the Barnes
result. Stevens suggested that there were far narrower grounds to reject the punitive damages
award; he would have relied on City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981)
(holding that municipalities are not subject to punitive damages absent clear contrary
congressional intent). Stevens questioned the relevance of the contract analogy for a claim of
tortious action, and expressed concern about the potentially far-reaching and unforeseen
consequences of the broad theory embraced by the "fearless crusaders" who joined the Court's
opinion. Barnes, 122 S. Ct. at 2104-05 n.3. Scalia responded to what he dubbed Stevens'
"Chicken-Little statement" by sarcastically claiming that "we surely do not deserve his praise
that we are 'fearless crusaders." Id. at 2102 n.2.
199. MARTHA MINOW, MAKINGALLTHE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN
LAW (1990).
200. Id. at 20-21.
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Department policy, all displaced persons had to be treated equally:
the same repatriation policy, the same exercise regimen, and the
same diet. The survivors of the extermination camps and their
former guards, therefore, were housed together and treated exactly
the same, with fatal results. 201
Some of the Supreme Court's most vital constitutional holdings
over the past fifty years turn on the basic recognition that "[e]qual
protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate
imposition of inequalities."' As Chief Justice Rehnquist recently
wrote for the Court, the Equal Protection Clause "embodies a
general rule that States must treat like cases alike but may treat
unlike cases accordingly. ' 3 Finally, the Court recognized decades
ago that "community prejudices are not static, and from time to time
other differences from the community norm may define other groups
which need the same protection" from the Court as do racial
minorities.2 ' The "protection" part of equal protection at times
requires careful scrutiny of treatment that, at least on the surface,
appears to be equal.
Until recently, moreover, it seemed clear that Congress had
expansive power to enforce civil rights with whatever civil and even
criminal remedies it thought might be effective. Thirty years ago, for
example, Chief Justice Burger wrote enthusiastically for a
unanimous Court that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
"proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."2 5 Indeed, the Griggs
201. See YOSEF Dov SHEINSON, A SURviVORS' HAGGADAH xiv-xv, 76-77 (Saul Touster ed.,
1998).
202. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9
(1967) (recognizing that the "fact of equal application does not immunize [Virginia's anti-
miscegenation] statute" from very heavy burden of justification required of racial
classifications).
203. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997).
204. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,478 (1954) (invalidatingjury selection process with
effect of excluding Mexican Americans). Hernandez was a unanimous decision written by
Chief Justice Warren and handed down two weeks prior to Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
205. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431(1971) (invalidating "built-in headwinds"
imposed by company's seemingly neutral job requirements; the vote was eight-to-zero, with
Justice Brennan not participating). Jacobus ten Broek provided a pioneering argument for a
higher duty of care for people with disabilities in the context of tort law in Jacobus ten Broek,
The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841 (1966).
See generally Michael Ashley Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality, and Workers with
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Court invoked "the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox," in
which the more powerful fox cannot drink from a long, thin jug at
all.20 6 The Court declared itself bound to follow Congress' decision
that "the vessel in which the milk is proffered be one all seekers can
use."
207
This fable seems more apt to the situations of many people with
disabilities who invoke the ADA's public accommodation protections
than does the series of analogies proposed by Judge Posner and
embraced by Justice Scalia. The Griggs Court's sense of legislative
power to seek change through increased efforts to guarantee civil
rights is directly apropos of the ADA. Yet a majority of the current
Justices are extremely dubious about any room for Congress
between the market and the Court's own constitutional holdings. In
many situations, Congress may not expand civil rights beyond the
territory where the Court itself already has gone. If this trend has
not yet taken the form of massive constitutional invalidations-
though the Court is already doing such things when the states
themselves are involved -- the Court's miserly reading of the ADA
illustrates some of the myriad of other methods available to activist
judges bent on construing a broad civil rights statute nearly to
oblivion.
In a sad echo of the Court's own role in aiding and abetting the
rise of Jim Crow in the Reconstruction Era, which culminated in
Plessy v. Ferguson"9 and its progeny, the Court today again insists
on its own authority to interpose a protective cordon around a broad
enclave of social and commercial matters. Congress may not intrude
into this sanctuary for private ordering, even in the name of civil
rights.210 Indeed, deference to private ordering reaches to the
contact zone of the deference required by the essentials of state
sovereignty. For the Court today, no middle ground can be
sustained.
Disabilities, 21 BERmLEY J. EmP. & LAB. L. 314 (2000).
206. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and discussion of Garrett regarding New
Federalism, supra, at 19-26.
209. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
210. For one of the many critical discussions of the Court's interposition of its New
Federalism beliefs, see Soifer, supra note 14, at 1321-28.
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B. Public Accommodation: Moving the Middle Ground
But there is middle ground. A great deal of it, in fact. It is where
we really live our lives. The intertwining of our better angels and
our baser selves is probably the universal human condition. We are
all individuals; we are all members of a multitude of groups. Each
of us is full of change, compromise, and various abilities-and then
we change again.
It must be conceded, however, that both judicial and statutory law
involve drawing lines and making decisions intended to reach
beyond individual cases on the day they are handed down. Yet even
in law there is and ought to be a great deal of nonbinary middle
ground.
One prime example of important middle ground-directly
relevant to our consideration of ADA issues-is the realm of public
accommodations. Public accommodations have been neither entirely
private nor entirely public for centuries; there is, for example, a
strong common law tradition obliging those who own and run public
accommodations to serve even those who are outsiders or otherwise
different somehow.2 '
After all, despite its appalling shortsightedness, even the Civil
Rights Cases decision simply assumed that law at the state level
obliged innkeepers, people operating public transportation, and
similar ventures to serve the general public.2'2 In dissent, the first
Justice Harlan presciently made the point that Congress surely had
the power to regulate such quasi-public entities, and that terrible
things would follow from the majority's crabbed view of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Harlan thus built upon
the majority's sense of obligatory public accommodations law.213
The current Court, of course, has embraced the Civil Rights Cases
as a key precedent pointing the way to constitutional limitations on
211. Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1291-93 (1996).
212. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 19, 24-25 (1883) (assuming "a right to enjoy equal
accommodation and privileges" to be an essential right, but insisting that remedial authority
must be left to the states).
213. Id. at 37-48 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing denial of equal accommodations in
public conveyances, inns, and places of public amusement as denial of basic civil rights and
as badge of servitude).
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Congress' civil rights enforcement power.214 Today's Justices have
made it clear that they do not approve of broad state protections for
public accommodations. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,215 for
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist bemoaned the extensive reach of
the New Jersey statute that, according to the New Jersey Supreme
Court, required the Boy Scouts not to discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation.216 But even so, public accommodations law
continues to change and adjust to better understood (or even newly
recognized) forms of unacceptable discriminatory activity.217
The ADA lists twelve categories of public accommodations,
thereby broadening the range of quasi-public and quasi-private
territory in which private discrimination may not go unnoticed.
Private discrimination, moreover, can even take the form of equal
treatment. Echoing federal civil rights statutes stretching back to
1866, the ADA's guarantees are for "full" as well as for "equal"
enjoyment of whatever is offered by these public accommodations
to the general public.21 My suggestion, in keeping with the
general rules of statutory interpretation, is that "full" ought not to
be considered surplusage or redundant with "equal." Indeed, a
guarantee of full and equal rights, benefits, privileges, and so forth
points directly to evaluations on a case-by-case basis. This approach
is particularly needed when the equal treatment of non-similarly-
situated people penalizes or stigmatizes some individuals beneath
the cloak of treating everyone alike.
214. Ironically, if one were to use the current Court's approach which severely limits the
power of Congress to invoke Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not even clear
that Congress constitutionally could depart from the holding of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. 393 (1856) in its significant array of civil rights statutes passed from 1866-1875. See
generally Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001);
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441(2000); Aviam Soifer, Full and Equal
Rights of Conscience, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 469, 484-92 (2000).
215. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
216. Id. at 656-57. The Court also strongly disagreed with a state court's interpretation of
its state public accommodation law in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (unanimously holding that requiring private citizens to
provide access to their St. Patrick's Day Parade for a group whose message the parade
organizers found repugnant is unconstitutional).
217. Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85
MiNN. L. REV. 1591, 1613-29 (2001).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31 § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
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C. Full and Equal Guarantees
Many people currently seem to embrace the struggle of each
against all as if humanity were back in a state of nature.
Competition and private ordering certainly have reached the marble
halls of the Supreme Court. What is often missed, however, is that
even John Locke--often portrayed as the patron saint of
individualistic striving--claimed that mankind abandoned the state
of nature specifically to gain protection from the state.21 9
Reciprocal obligations of allegiance and protection, linking
citizens and the state, constituted a major motif in eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century American political thought. This point helps
explain why it then was more generally acceptable than it is today
for government to foster economic growth and to regulate private
ordering for the public good.220 It also underscores a claim made by
Justice Holmes, rejecting his colleagues' enthusiasm for the liberty
of contract. Holmes vigorously dissented, for example, when the
majority in Coppage v. Kansas221 struck down an attempt by the
state legislature to protect workers from being coerced into "yellow
dog" contracts, through which employees had to renounce any union
membership. He wrote that the state could intervene to "establish
the equality of position between the parties in which liberty of
contract begins."222 For the Coppage majority, however, Justice
Pitney proclaimed it is "from the nature of things impossible to
uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property without
at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of
fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those
rights."223 Public accommodations law usefully can be viewed as an
219. See Carlos A. Ball, Autonomy, Justice, and Disability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 599, 606-15
(2000).
220. See, e.g., OSCAR HANDLIN & MARYF. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE
OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861 (1947); WILLIAM J.
NOvAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
(1996); Leonard W. Levy, The Police Power, in THE LAW OF mE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF
JUSTICE SHAW 229-65 (1957).
221. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
222. Id. at 27 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379, 399-400 (1937) ("The community is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for
unconscionable employers. The community may direct its law.making power to correct the
abuse which springs from their selfish disregard of the public interest.").
223. Coppage, 236 U.S. at 17.
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example of the democratic process seeking to split the difference
between these two positions.
An example from history is illuminating: Ollie's Barbecue in
Birmingham, Alabama certainly had business reasons as well as
constitutional claims of freedom from forced association and
federalism to defend its racial exclusion policies. Yet it did not
matter to the Supreme Court that Ollie's employed black people, nor
that black customers could buy barbecue "to go" at the take-out
counter.224 Nor would the Court have been likely to find Title II, the
public accommodations section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, satisfied
if Ollie's owners had responded to outside government pressure and
let black people sit in the restaurant, but then placed a cap on their
portion size. Like the ADA's public accommodation provision
considered in the Martin context, Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act guarantees "full and equal" access and service.22 It thus
contains the potential for: standardless federal judicial oversight of
the size of portions or the relative quality of the cuts of meat.
Nonetheless, in the face of vehement resistance, Title II made and
continues to make a difference without tying the courts in knots. It
deals with meals enjoyed as well as with the unquantifiable dignity
of those who, through the new protection of federal civil rights laws,
could get into places of public accommodation and not be penalized,
mistreated, or neglected once present at the table as fully equal
customers.
D. Standardless Judgments and the Judicial Role: Protection
To take the "full" part of "full and equal" seriously is to concede
that many cases will be difficult. The ADA itself provides that only
reasonable accommodations will be required, and then only if these
accommodations do not fundamentally alter the service or product
at issue.226 This kind of decision making is familiar in both our
private and our public law. The common law tradition famously
builds case-by-case, of course, but so does much of constitutional
law. The development of the regulatory takings doctrine, embraced
224. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
225. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2000).
226. Id. § 12182(bX2XAXiii).
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by the same Justices who seem most keen to rely on essences in the
realm of discrimination law, may serve as a good example.
From its start in an opinion by Justice Holmes in the 1920s, the
doctrine of regulatory takings has been said to be a question of
degree. 7 Unless all economic value is destroyed, today a property
owner who pursues a regulatory takings claim will find her
situation judged in terms of relative economic impact, her particular
investment-backed expectations, and the government interest at
stake in the challenged legal action.'" Moreover, even if the
challenged law was invalidated, or if it already was in place when
the property owner took title,' she still can come to court to claim
she was wronged.
At first glance, the regulatory takings plaintiff may not seem to
afford a paradigmatic case for a person with disabilities who claims
protection under the ADA. But neither kind of claim is categorical,
and both potentially involve courts in nitty-gritty, fact-dependent
inquiries. More significantly, both the takings claimant and the
person with disabilities may find legal relief for being treated
differently from the rest of society. Each would like to be protected
in the full and equal enjoyment of something important. In both
cases, moreover, the impact of a facially neutral decision may
intrude on the individual's specific situation so directly, grossly, or
arbitrarily as to demand legal redress."'
What the disabled person has that the property owner lacks,
however, is individual membership in a group found by Congress to
be
a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with
restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are
227. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,416 (1922).
228. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
229. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (finding a taking despite the fact that
the regulation was imposed before the owner's acquisition of the property); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (finding damages
were required for temporary period when taking was in effect).
230. Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 628 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (finding "irrational and wholly
arbitrary" demand and actions by Village sufficient to state traditional equal protection
claim).
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beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from
stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual
ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to,
society.23'
Past discrimination is surely relevant in a remedial statutory
scheme.
Our judges, after insisting on individualized judgments in
construing the ADA, 2 ought not impose the burdens of hostile and
arbitrary individualized judgments against ADA claimants. Indeed,
the essence of legal protection in court is anchored in the effort to
provide an adequate, as well as an equal, hearing to every claim,
and to strive to vindicate fully the rights of those for whom equal
treatment requires special attention and even, at times, reasonable
accommodation.
A recent First Circuit decision provides an excellent example,
directly contrasting with the Court's markedly parsimonious ap-
proach to the ADA. Could Kelly Gillen, a young woman born with a
left arm that ends a few inches below her elbow, be employed as an
Emergency Medical Technician (EMT)? Fallon Ambulance Service
rejected Gillen, though she had "performed impeccably in a myriad
of jobs."23 Relying in part on a doctor's opinion, the ambulance
service argued that two-handed lifting was one of the "essential
functions" of the job.23' Judge Selya's opinion carefully outlined the
appropriate procedural framework when an ADA claim is met with
a summary judgment motion, and stated that the key is "to
distinguish between unfounded stereotypes, on the one hand, and
frank assessments of the actual consequences of a disability, on the
231. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(aX7).
232. See Soifer, supra note 14, at 1299-1312.
233. Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2002).
234. Id. Both the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000), and EEOC regulations describe the
need for an applicant to be able to perform the "essential functions" ofajob, and both mention
some kinds of evidence that might establish what those functions entail. As Judge Selya
explained: "The purpose of these provisions is not to enable courts to second-guess legitimate
business judgments, but, rather, to ensure that an employer's asserted requirements are
solidly anchored in the realities of the workplace, not constructed out of whole cloth." Gillen,
283 F.3d at 25. Recognizing that "the line between an essential function that seems at first
blush to be self-evident and a marginal function is sometimes blurred," id. at 28, the First
Circuit carefully considered, for example, how long, under what circumstances, and how
consistently the employer had maintained that "two-handed lifting" was essential.
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other hand."2 5 Gillen, in fact, had been certified as an EMT, and she
already was employed as an EMT by another company. She also had
undertaken a weight-lifting regimen and had successfully
demonstrated her ability to lift the amount of weight the employer
declared necessary to do the job.236 Judge Selya argued that
summary judgment was therefore not appropriate based on the
record before the district court. After all, one of the primary goals of
the ADA is "to prohibit employers from making adverse employment
decisions based on stereotypes and generalizations associated with
the individual's disability rather than on the individual's actual
characteristics."237
This does not mean, of course, that every access or accom-
modation claim should succeed. If people in wheelchairs probably
ought to gain access to the floating craps tables as well as to the
bathroom aboard the Casino Princesa,23 ' it does not follow that a
belated request for a special access ticket to a sold-out professional
sports event must be honored.239 Nor does the Martin case mean
that a racquetball player in a wheelchair is entitled to an extra
bounce in a club tournament.2" But there is not and should not be
any essentialist answer to the knotty, daily issues that arise as we
try to give full meaning to full and equal civil rights for everyone.
CONCLUSION
The term "accommodate" originally meant "suited," "adapted," or
"fitting" and, in 1769, one Sir J. Reynolds wrote: "The regular
progress of cultivated life is from necessaries to accommodations,
235. Id. at 29. It is hard to tell if the pun was intended. In any event, the First Circuit's
emphasis on the fact-dependent nature of the appropriate judicial inquiry led it to
insist-unlike the Court in Echazabal, discussed supra at note 192-that "a physician's
endorsement does not provide complete insulation..... Id. at 31.
236. Id. at 19.
237. Id. at 29 (quoting EEOC v. Prevo's Family Mkt., Inc., 135 F.3d 1089, 1097 (6th Cir.
1998)).
238. Ass'n for Disabled Ams. v. Concorde Gaming Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (S.D. Fla.
2001) (requiring bathroom access, but not access to gaming tables).
239. Access Now, Inc. v. South Fla. Stadium Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
(giving no right to additional special access tickets for sold-out professional sports event).
240. Kuketz v. MDC Fitness Corp., No. CA 9-0114-A, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 347 (Aug.
17,2001) (upholding single bounce rule).
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from accommodations to ornaments. 24' In contrast to the Court's
recent practice, I will not claim that a dictionary definition should
be the basis for deciding vital public issues. But nondiscrimination
and the new accommodations specifically recognized and guaranteed
by the ADA constitute precisely the kinds of changes that are
"fitting" and "suitable." They remain necessaries that can and
should be worked out step-by-step over time.
Just as the basic attack on racial discrimination in the 1964 and
1965 Civil Rights Acts denoted progress for Americans of all races,
the ADA's set of guarantees is actually vital to everyone.
Discrimination may save money in the short run, of course, and it
may be acceptable and even popular at times. But full and equal
American citizenship demands a national guarantee of equal
opportunity, equal access, and reasonable accommodation-even for
those among us who may be different. By now, we ought to recognize
that, at least in some contexts, formal evenhandedness will prove
woefully inadequate to the task of affording real equality to
different people.
We know that defining which cases actually are like cases, and
then treating them alike, is a tricky, open-ended challenge. In our
families, jobs, schools, and neighborhoods, moreover, we also
recognize that basic fairness sometimes demands differential
treatment. Throughout the ADA, Congress provided ways to take
different human contexts into account, recognizing that the
demands of equality cannot stop abruptly at some arbitrary
threshold. Fundamentally, it appears that the current Court simply
does not like the messiness of adjustments that are neither "either"
nor "or." Despite the hostility of the Justices, however, case-by-case
progress accommodating the basic rights of people who have faced,
and still face, significant discrimination is more than proper. It
remains within the essential public interest of us all. In fact and in
context, our general welfare demands no less.
241. OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 58-59 (Compact ed., 1971).
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